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Abstract
This paper explores the racism of mainstream feminism and the ways in which what we think of as feminism
has not adequately addressed the needs of black women in the United States. It describes some of the ways in
which black women’s experiences of oppression in the United States differ from white women’s. It then
proposes a methodological tool for avoiding racism in feminist political theory, “Gender Plus,” which calls for
feminist theorists to consider at least one level of inquiry beyond gender when formalizing theory. This paper
engages in “Gender Plus” by using race as an example level of inquiry beyond gender, and shows how
acknowledging and considering the races of the women theorists study can aid in combating tendencies
toward racism in feminist thought.
Keywords
feminism, racism, political theory, Social Sciences, Political Science, Nancy Hirschmann, Hirschmann, Nancy
Disciplines
Political Science
This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/curej/56
1
Gender Plus: Toward a More Inclusive Feminism
Corinne Smith
Senior Honors Thesis in Political Science
University of Pennsylvania
Advised by Dr. Nancy J. Hirschmann
Spring, 2007
2
Table of Contents
Part I: The Problem with the Category “Woman”…………………………...3
Part II: Gender Plus………………………………………………………….21
Part III: Black Feminism and Intersectionality…………………………….38
Part IV: Conclusion………………………………………………………….59 
 
References…………………………………………………………………….80
3
Part I: The Problem with the Category “Woman”
All the women are white, all the Blacks are men, but some of us are brave (Gloria T. Hull,
Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith 1982).
Feminists assert that while choices in life are constrained by various factors, women’s
choices are systematically more constrained than men’s. Almost every society in the world
is organized patriarchally, which is to say that men rather than women identifiably and
systematically dominate society and politics. Men in patriarchal societies control
government, business, religious organizations, and families. They are the policy makers, the
arbiters, the capitalists, the priests, ministers, and rabbis, and the fathers. Thus the societal
and political contexts, or the conditions under which human interaction and the competition
over scarce resources take place, are organized and managed by men. By this definition, the
United States is arguably a patriarchal society. For instance, under such management,
women in the United States could not vote until 1920, could not legally terminate a
pregnancy until 1973, could not seek refuge from domestic violence in a shelter until 1974,
and could legally be raped by their husbands until the late 1970s (The National Center for
Victims of Crime 2004). These injustices are symptomatic of the sexist oppression that
occurs under patriarchy.
Feminism is a social and political movement that seeks to identify, interpret, and then
redress the kind of oppression which systematically constrains women’s choices more than
men’s, and which fosters injustices such as violence against women and a societal structure
that allows that violence. Sexist oppression affects women, so in order to understand and
reduce its effects, feminists must understand women. Doing so involves conceptualizing the
social and political category, “woman.” What does it mean to be a woman besides
4
possessing the biological traits of a female? (Indeed, which biological traits are “female”?)
One feminist approach to this question points to the theoretical relevance of differences in
perspective (see, for example, Collins 1986). A feminist perspective describes the world-
view women share, arising from acknowledgment of experiences that are common among
women, but, by and large, not among men. Hartsock (1983) argues that a world-view formed
from shared experiences of oppression is “less partial and perverse” than the dominant
ideology1, in this case white men’s world-view, because it accounts for social phenomena
that the dominant ideology ignores. One way to conceptualize this approach would be to
imagine a stadium: concentric rows of seats rise from a middle platform. The platform
represents the power center, thus the rows of seats farther down are closer to the power
center, and the people who sit in those rows have more power. Farther up, the occupants
have less power, but a broader view. The people in the back row can see the entire stadium,
including the people in the rows in front of them and the platform, but they cannot see the
main act as well; they see more broadly, but in less detail. They see more of the audience,
and less of the main act. Therefore, they have less access to power, but more awareness of
the power relationships among the audience members. Given a patriarchal system, men sit in
the front rows of the stadium and women sit farther up, behind them. Women have less
power, or a worse view of the stage, but their broader perspective affords them a more
accurate view of the power structures of the world; although they cannot see the main act in
detail, they have a better understanding of where the main act is taking place in relation to the
audience, as well as where some members of the audience are sitting in relation to others.
The lack of power of women, as compared to men, constitutes a shared experience of
1 Hartsock (1983) theorizes that a world-view arising from “shared experiences of oppression” constitutes
“standpoint,” a special kind of perspective that is more accurate and complete than perspectives that do not
benefit from such constitution, but the intricacies of standpoint theory are beyond the scope of this paper.
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oppression among women (Hartsock 1983) and, although it results in political inferiority, it
can also result in epistemological superiority insofar as it allows them a less limited view.
But do all women really share a lack of power to the same extent and have the same view?
The stadium imagery, thus far, seems to treat women and men as unified categories,
but there are factors other than gender that divide people’s perspectives epistemologically.
Feminists have argued that reproduction, the biological abilities to give birth and to lactate;
relegation to the home, or relegation to jobs such as nursing, teaching, social work, and
secretarial work, that tend to be socially devalued and low-paying; and exclusion from rights
afforded to men, are among the material experiences that U.S. women have shared
historically and that have led to their common understanding of the world. But what do we
mean by “women,” really? Which women share the experience of relegation to the domestic
sphere? Have all women in the United States been consigned to the home or to the same
types of low-paying jobs and denied education in a shared historical fashion? Or are there
systematic differences in how women have been treated within the gender category
“woman”?
Reproductive freedom has long been an issue central to feminism. An historical
examination of feminists’ discussion regarding reproductive freedom, however, reveals that
this issue is a good example of how black and white women have different perspectives on
what “freedom” means for “women.” White feminists have often pushed for access to
abortion as necessary for women’s liberation, while black women in the U.S. have been
encouraged to abort their pregnancies, and have even experienced forced sterilization
throughout the 20th century. Black women share the oppressive experience of wanting to be
able to have children and to stay home and take care of them, as white middle- and upper-
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class mothers have historically been able to do in the United States, but often not having the
financial resources or support from the state necessary to do so. Angela Davis (1981)
chronicles the historical differences between black women’s and white women’s experiences
of reproductive oppression, in order to explain why black women did not join white feminists
in the 1970s abortion rights advocacy movement. Black women had been aborting their
pregnancies since the early days of slavery (Davis 1981, 204), in order desperately to save
their unborn children from the horrors of their own daily lives (Davis 1981, 205), and
therefore they generally do not associate abortion with freedom. Post-slavery, and into the
20th century, black women were disproportionately victims of illegal and dangerous abortions
(Roberts 1997, 101) as well as legal yet unsafe temporary sterilization methods such as
Norplant (Roberts 1997, 138) and Depo-Provera (Roberts 1997, 145). Black women have
fought for access to safe methods of birth control, but fear government programs and
incentives for poor women regarding such methods, as such encouragement curbs women’s
reproductive autonomy. White feminists who have promoted abortion rights and birth
control access are reacting to white women’s history of being encouraged, or often forced, to
reproduce. As the birthrate among U.S. white women declined in the late 19th century, the
concept of “race suicide” was introduced and deprecated among white national leaders, and
was mentioned by President Theodore Roosevelt in his 1906 State of the Union address. He
called the declining birthrate among American white women “the one sin for which the
penalty is national death, race suicide” (Davis 1981, 209). This characterization was meant
to encourage white women to fulfill their “duty” to maintain white people’s numerical racial
dominance. The illegality of abortion until 1973 often prevented women from terminating
pregnancies that either threatened their health or that they could not afford to bring to term;
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poor women in desperation were often faced with the choice between dangerous,
unregulated, illegal abortions, and the health risks or financial burden of bearing and rearing
a child. As Davis argues, black women confronted with this dilemma were more often
ushered toward terminating their pregnancies, while white women confronted with similar
dilemmas were ushered toward carrying their pregnancies to term. The racial-political
culture of the U.S. was, and has been, one that frames bearing children as white women’s
duty, and black women’s privilege.
In both cases, women’s reproductive autonomy has been diminished, but the
Women’s Liberation movement has not been effective at drawing in black women, because
of its specific way of defining reproductive freedom. When white feminists of the Women’s
Liberation movement promoted abortion rights and access to birth control as the key to
women’s freedom to pursue higher education and career opportunities, they ignored black
women’s history of having to abort and prevent pregnancies, which had not led them to
greater access to higher education and more desirable jobs. Although abortion was legalized
with the landmark Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade in 1973, Congress withdrew federal
funding for abortions with the passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1977. Black women,
along with poor white women, were thus effectively stripped of the right to legal abortion.
Meanwhile, surgical sterilizations were easily accessible, and remained federally-funded.
Once again, black women had better access to unsafe abortions than to safe ones in legal
clinics, and moreover, politicians saw no injustice in funding clinics that disproportionately
sterilized black women. Poor black women were often forced to choose permanent infertility
(Davis 1981, 206) as a condition for medical treatment, or in other cases, they were sterilized
by their doctors without being told ahead of time. According to Roberts, in 1955 all 23
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sterilizations in the South Carolina State Hospital that year were performed on black women,
and in 1965, “60 percent of the Black women in Sunflower County, Mississippi, were
subjected to postpartum sterilizations at Sunflower County Hospital without their
permission” (1997, 90). In 1972, hospital records of South Carolina’s Aiken County
“showed that of 34 deliveries paid for by Medicaid [that year], eighteen included sterilization
and that all eighteen were Black women” (Aptheker 1974, 39). Also in 1972, in
Massachusetts, a group of medical students reported to the Boston Globe repeated cases of
sterilizations of black women:
Boston City Hospital was performing excessive and medically
unnecessary hysterectomies on Black patients…surgeries were performed
for “training purposes”; radical and dangerous procedures were used when
alternatives were available; medical records did not reflect what had really
been done to patients; patients were pressured into signing consent forms
without adequate explanation; and doctors treated patients callously,
adding to the women’s anguish (Roberts 1997, 91).
There is evidence that forced sterilization of black women was a federal government effort:
many black girls were force-sterilized in birth control clinics funded by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (Davis 1981, 216). In a 1973 class action law suit filed in
federal court, “Judge Gerhard Gesell found that an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 poor
women…had been sterilized annually under federally funded programs. A study discovered
that nearly half of the women sterilized were Black” (Roberts 1997, 93).
Although white feminists’ aim was reproductive freedom for women, they cast that
freedom specifically in terms of abortion, and thus took a universal goal with which all
human beings could identify, and which men take for granted—bodily autonomy—and
turned it into an historically-specific demand: safe and legal abortion. By narrowing their
focus, they failed to see that they thereby excluded many categories of women. Davis argues
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that, although autonomy for women requires that they be able to control their reproduction,
the “feminist” movements for women’s liberation and reproductive freedom have not
effectively incorporated the needs and concerns of black women. White feminists have
either not understood, or perhaps not had knowledge of, the ways in which black women’s
historical experiences with reproductive freedom have differed from their own. Black
women’s reproductive autonomy has suffered in that black women have often been forced or
encouraged to halt their reproduction. The root of the problem is the systemic racism within
reproductive policy in the United States; application of the laws that govern access to birth
control and abortions has a racist orientation, such that women’s choices are often limited
unjustly, and such that those injustices vary by race. Central to the racial divisions in
feminism is the fact that black women’s and white women’s choices have historically been
limited in different ways, and that black women’s and white women’s perspectives, thus,
differ. Those differences as well as white feminists’ failure to acknowledge or to understand
them, have impeded unification across racial lines in the feminist movement.
Patricia Hill Collins (1986) points to another example of the ways in which white
feminists have excluded black women by taking a universal goal and making it too
historically specific, and of the ways in which black women’s and white women’s viewpoints
differ. While white feminists have pushed for the right and opportunity to work outside the
home, black women throughout U.S. history have been forced to work outside the home, and
many want the right and opportunity to stay home and care for their children. In the post-
Civil War era, black women shifted from slavery to domestic work in white families’ homes,
and from this particular experience arose an insight into race and gender relations that black
women in the U.S. share.
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Collins challenges the validity of Simone de Beauvoir’s application of the Hegelian
self/other dialectic to the genders in de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. De Beauvoir argues that
women are locked in a state of immanence and are socially constructed as the “other” in
relation to men’s “selves.” Men are socially constructed to transcend the immanent
environment of the home and to venture out, discover the world, and make their own
decisions, while women are disabled from determining who they are, because they are
produced not to be beings who discover the world for themselves, nor to make their own
choices. For Collins, the duality of “self” versus “other” is problematic. Black women are
socially constructed as the “other” to the “selves” of white men, black men, and white
women. Their experiences are not determined merely by the fact that their gender and their
race cause them to experience subordination, or “otherness” in two different arenas; rather, as
Collins describes it, black women experience interlocking oppression, because of the fact that
they are black women, not black and happen to be women, or women who happen to be
black. What de Beauvoir fails to see is that all women have a race and a gender, both of
which affect their experiences of oppression. Just as white women’s choices regarding
contraception and abortion in the U.S. have been limited in certain ways, black women’s
reproductive choices have been limited in other ways, and the social and political effects of
racism and classism seem to account for those differences. Collins proposes that, instead of
“otherness,” black women’s collective, historical experience with domestic work in white
people’s homes creates, to use Hartsock’s (1983) phrasing, a “less partial and less perverse”
perspective. She uses a metaphor described by a 73-year-old black woman, Nancy White, in
a 1980 interview with John Gwaltney, to elucidate the theoretical relevance of difference in
perspective as applied to black women and white women (Collins, 1986, S17):
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My mother used to say that the black woman is the white man’s mule and
the white woman is his dog. Now, she said that to say this: we do the
heavy work and get beat whether we do it well or not. But the white
woman is closer to the master and he pats them on the head and lets them
sleep in the house, but he ain’t gon’ treat neither one like he was dealing
with a person (Gwaltney 1980, 148).
Black women’s status as domestic employees in white homes gave them a familiarity with
white families and white people, but the social distinctions of race and gender were
maintained such that black women were still outsiders among white people while
experiencing life within white homes. Black women’s viewpoint is an insight into
themselves and their experiences, what it is to be a black woman in the U.S., as well as into
the experiences of those for whom they have worked, what it is to be a white woman or a
white man in the U.S. As outsiders, they gain a somewhat impartial perspective on gender
relations among white people, and as outsiders within, black women can combine their
impartiality with the knowledge they glean from the white female or white male experience
from being present in private, white spheres.
The salient point for feminists to draw from the argument that black women’s
collective perspective is less partial and perverse than white women’s is not that black
women are necessarily “more” oppressed, but rather that their oppression takes different
forms, forms that can in fact be inflicted by white women. Accordingly, if feminism is to be
truly “universal,” it must attend to black women, who have something important to
contribute to the development of feminism.
Yet black women’s collective viewpoint and the acknowledgement of black women’s
historical oppression has not been welcomed in the “women’s”2 movement. Bell hooks
2 I will purposely put “women” in quotation marks when I am using the term in a way to illustrate the false
universalization of the claim, i.e. when white women feminists talk about “women” as if they mean all women,
when in fact, they mean more particularly, white and middle-class women.
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(1981) shows that a central corollary of the development of “feminism” has been a
perpetuation of the racial hierarchies of U.S. society. White women involved in “women’s”
liberation in the 20th century saw only what stood between themselves and the center of
power—white men. They strove for equality for themselves, not with all men, but with white
men. By making white men their opponents in the struggle for liberation, white feminists
were able to distance themselves from racism by allying it with white male-dominated
patriarchy. This allowed them to appear to include black women without having actually to
consider the ways in which their very efforts at promoting “feminism” betrayed their deep-
seated racism toward black women. Consequently, white women activists in the
development of feminism were not able to gain real support from black women, nor were
they really pursuing their purported goal—the expansion of rights for all women. According
to hooks,
If the white women who organized the contemporary movement toward
feminism were at all remotely aware of the racial politics in American
history, they would have known that overcoming barriers that separate
women from one another would entail confronting the reality of racism,
and not just racism as a general evil in society but the race hatred they
might harbor in their own psyches (1981, 122).
White feminists have been slow to recognize the differences between the history of the
oppression of black women and their own oppression in the U.S. Hooks argues furthermore,
that white feminists have claimed to champion anti-racism but have in fact, not only not
fought against racism, but have used racial hierarchy to their advantage. White feminist
abolitionists fought against the immorality of slavery, but not the racist ideology that upheld
it (hooks 1981, 125). In the struggle for women’s right to vote, white suffragists did not
promote that right for black women. Some, in fact, argued that the enfranchisement of white
women would support the perpetuation of white supremacy in their appeal to southern white
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women (hooks 1981, 127). In the early decades of the 20th century, white women activists
did not advocate better jobs for black women, but appeared to consider black women a threat
in their pursuit of industrial employment (hooks 1981, 132). In the “women’s” movement of
the 1960’s and 70’s, white women writers such as Helen Hacker and Catherine Stimpson
likened the plight of “women” to that of “blacks” (hooks 1981, 139), thus suggesting the
nonexistence of black women, or more accurately, the exclusion of black women from the
category “woman” in American society.
Hooks, in fact, points out that the very existence of a debate over whether or not
racism is a feminist issue demonstrates that white women who identify themselves as
feminists have been just as socialized as everyone else to accept the premises of racism
(1981, 122). If white feminists do not examine race as a determining factor in the experience
of womanhood in American society, hooks seems to argue, then they will continue to
perpetuate the racial caste system from which they benefit, and “feminism” will never
become inclusive enough to make a difference in the lives of black women in the U.S.
I agree with hooks’ reading of American feminism, and argue, then, that a feminist
perspective does not yet exist. Moreover, it only has the potential to exist insofar as women
share experiences of oppression across racial categories. Since women’s experiences of
oppression are gendered as well as raced, it appears that feminists do not yet know what
experiences are shared among all women. Black feminists assert that black women’s choices
are systematically constrained in different ways from white women’s, and in different ways
from black men’s, but because they highlight these differences in order to find and speak
with their own voices about their own experiences with oppression, black feminists receive
criticism from both white feminists and from some black men.
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White feminists have responded to black feminist assertions with concern over what
they mean for feminism, which claims to be a universal movement that takes up the social
and political concerns of all women. These white feminists argue that making politically
salient the differences between black women’s and white women’s experiences of oppression
undermines the political power of feminism, and that the reason feminism has not really
taken off as a successful social and political movement is that it is so splintered. These
critics, however, defend the political convenience of universality at the expense of black
women’s social and political concerns. They ignore race in order to build rather than to try to
understand the concept “woman.” The product, “woman” is presented as a person with
female organs but no race, but is in actuality a white woman who experiences forms of
oppression which other white women experience, but which are not generally shared across
race. Ignoring race means imagining an impossibility, a raceless human being, or it means
ignoring the members of races which are socially and politically subordinate. The former
does not advance the political salience of feminism, and the latter merely advances the
political salience of white feminism. This criticism of black feminism, therefore, serves the
particular interests of the white women; it calls white women’s experiences of oppression the
universal female experiences of oppression. In effect, what we think of as “feminism”
silences black women (as well as any other women who are not white).
That these white feminists criticize black feminism in this way poses the question:
why would so-called “feminists,” who aim to eradicate the systematic oppression of women,
disempower entire groups of women? A possible answer is hooks’ assertion that white
feminists are trying to preserve their race privilege. There could be some merit to her
argument because white feminists describe their own experiences of oppression as
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“women’s” experiences of oppression; they want black women to join their movement in
order for the movement to gain political salience, but they do not seem to want to understand
the experiences of black women, given that to do so would mean understanding racial
politics in America as well as their own racism. White feminists appear to be willing to
compromise the needs and concerns of black women in order to avoid compromising the
focus of the “feminist” movement, and to avoid questioning themselves. What these white
feminists do not recognize is that silencing the differences among women due to race
preserves white women’s race privilege. The reason this effect is unrecognized is the
propensity of white people to suppress the fact that they have a race, and that their race
constitutes a social and political advantage; the general silencing of race differences makes
white people’s race invisible to them, and it makes the privilege they derive from it invisible
as well—it assumes their advantages to be a social and political given. White feminists,
therefore, have much to gain for themselves by keeping their race and their race privilege
invisible, but doing so hampers the cause of black women and of other non-white women,
and it also hampers what feminism purports to be—the eradication of sexism and an
expansion of rights and freedoms for all women. They have failed to understand how sexism
really operates in the lives of women, and can only begin to reverse that failure by examining
how gender-based oppression is raced.
Black feminists also receive a similar form of criticism from some black men. Even
as black women try to liberate themselves from the racism inherent in white feminism, they
must grapple with the sexism of the racial struggle. Some black male critics object to black
feminist assertions that black women experience oppression differently from how they do, by
arguing that race is simply separate from gender, and that there are experiences black people
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share that transcend gender. Furthermore, black men have argued that black feminism is in
fact “counter-productive to the historical goal of the Black struggle,” (Collins 2000, 8).
These black men have sought to unite all U.S. black people under a universalized conception
of “black person”; they have tried to build a black perspective. “Black person” is presented
as a human form with a race and no gender, but is actually a black man, whose experiences
of oppression these critics have conflated with black people’s experiences of oppression.
Some black men have perpetuated this conflation in order to maintain their sexist domination
of black women. As bell hooks puts it,
The labeling of the white male patriarch as a “chauvinist pig” provided a
convenient scapegoat for black male sexists. They could join with white
and black women to protest against white male oppression and divert
attention away from their sexism, their support of patriarchy, and their
sexist exploitation of women. Black leaders, male and female, have been
unwilling to acknowledge black male sexist oppression of black women
because they do not want to acknowledge that racism is not the only
oppressive force in our lives (1981, 87-88).
Just as white feminists buttress their racial advantage by deemphasizing race and racism,
black men reinforce their sex advantage by deemphasizing gender and sexism. Yet, if we
really examine black men’s experiences, we will find that they are frequently gendered as
well as raced; black men obscure the truth of their own plight as well as that of black women
when they ignore gender. The ways in which black men are socially constructed as over
against white men are distinct from the ways in which black women are socially constructed;
their experiences of oppression are therefore shaped due to their gender as well as to their
race. In 1955, when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a public bus in Montgomery,
Alabama, to a white man, she was protesting the Jim Crow segregation laws that affected
black men and women alike. But if we consider what it means for a black woman to be
expected to give up her seat to a white man, when white men on public buses frequently give
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up their seats to white women, we see that gender is relevant to her experience with Jim
Crow segregation. Parks’ gender was socially constructed differently from that of the white
women around her. She was a woman who was not given the sexist consideration that a
white woman would have been given; when asked to move to the back of the bus, white men
treated her just like they would have treated a black man. Although it may seem that her
gender was ignored in this instance, and that it was therefore irrelevant to her treatment, it is
pertinent to the construction of black women that, through racism, their gender is capable of
being ignored. Even though segregation laws had equal de jure application to black men and
women, and though they were not technically gendered, gender was often relevant to the de
facto experience of living under those laws. Rosa Parks’ femininity was socially constructed
differently from that of the white women around her; the fact that she was a black woman yet
expected to give up her seat to a white man implies that gender, as it applied to her, informed
her experience of racist oppression.
Collins (2005) explains the development of this black male criticism by showing that
institutionalized racial violence against black men and black women has differed across
gender: lynching has targeted black men while rape has targeted black women. In the
movement for freedom from racist oppression, black men have claimed to bear the greater
burden of race by arguing that lynching is both completely different from and worse than
rape. Collins argues instead that lynching and rape are more accurately different forms of the
same kind of social control (2005, 218):
African American politics have been profoundly influenced by a Black
gender ideology that ranks race and gender in this fashion. Lynching and
rape have not been given equal weight and, as a result, social issues seen
as affecting Black men, in this case lynching, have taken precedence over
those that seemingly affect only Black women (rape).
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In the Anita Hill hearings, Clarence Thomas “recognize[ed] the historical importance placed
on lynching and the relative neglect of rape” and capitalized on the black gender ideology
that consistently advances the suffering of black men as more central to the suffering of black
people than the suffering of black women; he knew that emphasizing race would win him
more support than it would win Hill (Collins 2005, 223). The significance placed on
lynching rather than rape underscores how the experience of racist oppression is gendered.
Black men have universalized their own suffering with the suffering of all black people in the
U.S. and have thus silenced the suffering of black women. Just as black women’s femininity
is constructed differently from white women’s due to their race, black women’s race is also
constructed differently from black men’s due to their gender.
I propose that looking at gender plus race can aid feminists in understanding women
and sexism. I also believe that looking at gender as well as race can aid activists and students
in understanding racism, but the focus of this paper will be on the ways in which raced
experiences inform feminism. The social and political category “woman” does not exist as
we understand it. What has socially and politically been understood as “woman” is in fact a
product of the dominant racial ideology which ignores, and thereby silences, the experiences
of black women. When we think of what it is to be a woman in the United States, we most
often think of what it is to be a white woman. Just as “feminists” conflate “white woman”
with “woman” when they discuss women’s shared experiences of oppression, such as being
made to stay home, and many black men conflate “black man” with “black person” when
they point to such oppressive acts as lynching, white feminists also conflate “white man”
with “man” when they discuss “men” as holding positions of power in patriarchal societal
structures. White men, then, dominate white women, black women, and black men. White
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feminists and some black male critics silence black women by submerging black women’s
experiences of oppression and ignoring how their own experiences of oppression are raced as
well as gendered. Black women, in turn, need a social and political movement of their own
which can use a black feminist perspective to conceptualize black women’s collective
experiences of oppression, and in turn serve as the basis for the redress of black women’s
historical and present-day grievances. Given that both white women and black men have
silenced and oppressed black women, within the stadium imagery we can picture black
women in the upper tiers of the stadium, behind black men and white women, and far behind
white men. Black women, therefore, have a less perverse world-view than these other
groups, because they can see salient factors that have played a role in determining their
material, historical experiences; they have a more complete view of the stadium and of how
others relate to the center of power, given their historical status as “outsiders within,” yet
they cannot enact that vision because there are too many tiers between them and the center of
power, and they remain outsiders. This greater insight, potentially, can inform “feminism”
by expanding its boundaries. Feminism as a universal movement that fights for all women
does not yet exist, and furthermore, we do not yet know if it can. The only way to find out is
to take advantage of the opportunity to learn from less perverse and less partial worldviews,
and we can start with those of black women.
The idea of Gender Plus warns against deemphasizing, or silencing, salient political
cleavages that intersect with sexism and form different and particular experiences of
oppression in women’s lives. I shall explore one level of Gender Plus—race. More
particularly, I shall examine the notion of race as applied to African-Americans, and how it
affects sexist oppression in African-American women’s lives. As we bring to light salient
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political cleavages in order better to understand experiences of oppression, it becomes clear
that the more we recognize, the more complete our understanding of those experiences. I
shall limit myself to race, however, in order to show how the experiences of black women in
the U.S. demonstrate that the study of gender and sexist oppression must at least include one
further level of inquiry. Race has been fundamental to the social construction of black
women; issues of class, sexuality, religion, and others have, of course, informed black
women’s experiences of oppression, but black feminist theorist Collins implies that race is
more salient to black women’s collective perspective than class:
For most, middle-class Black achievement is only one generation away
form the racism of the past, and its effects are still felt. This racial
consensus has political effects in that African American voting behavior
demonstrates a commitment to racial solidarity. Despite the growth of a
new Black middle class, African Americans are more likely to vote as a
racial bloc than they are to vote their social class interests…most African
Americans recognize that class differences among African Americans are
now more pronounced. But when it comes to electoral politics, they
continue to choose race over class, that is, when they perceive they have a
choice at all (Collins 2005, 47).
Issues of class have the potential to become more and more salient for the experiences of
black people in the United States, and investigation into how class, sexuality, religion, etc.,
inform those experiences, would also give feminism more information about how gender-
based oppression operates in varying forms. With this project, I take one step to show that
feminists must acknowledge at least one other factor besides gender to comprehend what it is
to be a woman in the U.S.’s patriarchal society. Gender Plus reveals that the understanding
of gender is always incomplete, but adding at least one factor to the study of gender-based
oppression renders that study less partial and perverse.
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Part II: Gender Plus
Unless I know something more about two women than the fact that they are women, I can’t
say anything about what they might have in common (Elizabeth Spelman 1988).
Beyond simply ignoring the effects of racism, some white feminists have argued that
feminist thought should not be concerned with oppression that comes in any form other than
sexism. In other words, feminists must examine the harm done to “women as women” and
not to women as women of color or to women as lesbians, for example, because looking only
at sexism unqualified by racism or heterosexism allows a clearer picture of how gender-
based oppression operates (see Richards 1980 and Cantarella 1987). There is an argument to
be made here. Feminism cannot take on everything; it was designed not to save the whole
world, but to identify, interpret, analyze, and reduce and resist sexist oppression. Common
sense would seem to suggest that a movement needs an unambiguous and concise focus in
order to effect real change. Thus, the epistemological need to single out sexism in order to
understand how it functions follows as reasonable. If women are to answer the call to
feminism and be willing to allocate energy, time, and resources to carry out the movement’s
objective, they must be convinced that they know what they are fighting. As Janet Radcliffe
Richards puts it,
Feminism is not concerned with a group of people it wants to benefit, but
with a type of injustice it wants to eliminate…it is far more reasonable to
support a movement against injustice than a movement for women (1980,
5).
Richards argues that feminism cannot support or advocate women and their needs in every
circumstance; the objective is justice and women are capable of being in the wrong. Neither
can feminism be “a movement of women,” for that matter, because men, too, can be
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feminists. Rather, feminism must seek to understand and combat sexism. A concentration
on sexism does not have to suggest that it is more central to the human struggle than other
kinds of oppression; in fact, focusing on sexism does not have to entail a position at all on
racism, heterosexism, or classism. Feminists, by this line of reasoning, can say, “We are
looking at gender-based oppression in order to help those affected by it, period.”
Yet, the “sexism-only” approach to feminism is problematic. Given the assumption
of feminism that all women face sexist oppression, the goal must be to eradicate that
oppression for everyone who experiences it. When feminist theorists propose to look at
sexism as a sole variable, their objective appears to be controlling for other variables in order
to elucidate what sexism does and how. Instead, however, “sexism-only feminism” narrows
feminism’s scope to a particular set of cases that are not representative of all women. They
advocate a piecemeal strategy focused on specific problems and instances of injustice,
insofar as they seek to single out experiences and trends that derive specifically from sexism,
as over against those that derive from other forms of injustice. In the abstract, this appears to
be a perfectly legitimate, effective strategy. Elizabeth Spelman sums up this part of
Richards’ argument as follows:
The most paradigmatic examples of sexism are to be found in the lives of
women who are subject only to sexism and not to other forms of
oppression, for the treatment of these women has to do only with their
gender and nothing to do with their class, race, nationality, servile status,
etc. (1988, 52).
In operation, this piecemeal strategy seeks to isolate experiences of sexist oppression by
studying the lives of women who experience only sexist oppression and not other forms of
oppression, women who are oppressed “as women” (Spelman 1988, 51). Spelman finds this
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approach problematic in that it mistakenly presupposes the possibility of isolating gender and
sexism from race, for example:
Now it is important to see that [this] proposition…is flawed: women who
are not oppressed on account of their “race” are nevertheless not without a
“racial” identity, and this identity has as much to do with their position as
their gender—indeed, it is part of what shapes their gender identity
(Spelman 1988, 52).
The fact that some women are not subjected to racist oppression on account of their race does
not make those women raceless; in the United States, it merely makes them white (for the
most part). Rather, it is the fact that white women are not subjected to racist oppression on
account of their race, that shapes their experiences as different from those of women who are
subjected to racist oppression on account of their races. It is what makes them “white
women” and not raceless women. That “sexism-only feminism” assumes, by this logic, that
there are raceless women, and that it assumes from that, that those are the women who are
oppressed “as women,” betrays its vulnerability to conflating certain women with all women.
If some women can, in themselves, function as the control group, then their identities can be
said to be free of extra variables. But no women is raceless; all women vary by their races.
Similarly, no woman is free of a class standing or of a sexuality. More particularly, the
“sexism-only” approach is vulnerable to conflating white women with all women insofar as it
conflates women who are oppressed only as women—i.e. women who only experience sexist
oppression—with the term “women” in the fundamental sense. Indeed, it is vulnerable to
conflating white, middle- or upper-class, heterosexual women with all women. It defines
sexism in a way that attends only to those women’s experiences. “Sexism-only feminism”
thus privileges groups of women who enjoy a racial advantage rather than those who
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experience race-based oppression, and it is thus ill-equipped to end the sexism experienced
by non-white women.
A similar point can also be drawn from Collins’ (1986) discussion of white, middle-
class women as the “master’s dog” and black women as his “mule.” She suggests that white,
middle-class women are subject to a particular form of oppression by virtue of their race and
class; by being the master’s “pet,” his “dog” rather than his “mule,” they become implicated
in the very system that oppresses them. Indeed, it is this significant difference between the
position of white women and that of black women that is constitutive of white women’s race
privilege, and that, furthermore, gives white women the social and political power to ignore
the effects of race and to take their own experiences as representative of those of all women.
By this line of thinking, “sexism-only feminism” runs the risk of turning into a form of
“white feminism,” the former being, in practice, an attempt at a theoretical justification for
the latter. Spelman’s and Collins’ arguments that race shapes the experience of gender is
alone enough to invalidate “sexism-only” methodology, however. The historical differences
between black women’s and white women’s experiences with oppression attest further to the
notion that sexism does not exist outside of racism or outside of race privilege.
Neither of these approaches furthers the understanding or elimination of the sexism
that black women in the U.S. experience, and both essentialize “womanness.” “Sexism-only
feminism” inherently makes the claim that there is something in the experience of sexism
that is the same for all women, that any two women will suffer sexism in the same way. It
thus becomes unnecessary to distinguish between any two women. “White feminism,”
meanwhile, ignores the materially specific differences generated by experiences of sexism
which differ across race, and in turn creates an artificial “womanness” which is actually
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“white womanness.” By proposing an essential “womanness,” these perspectives not only
confine womanhood to a narrow, misrepresentative space, but they also suggest a concept
that is on its face problematic. Spelman describes this problem as having “the effect of
making women inessential in a variety of ways” (1988, 158). Essentializing “woman,”
leaves women—that is, flesh and blood women who do not, indeed cannot ever, match the
idealization such essentialism produces—out of the category, and such women thus become
theoretically excluded from “womanhood.” As Spelman points out, an essential
“womanness” implies that there is something that all women share that makes them women,
which, in turn, suggests that having any particular information about any one woman other
than that of her gender is superfluous. To understand what she is and who she is in the
world, one need not know anything about the specific circumstances of a woman’s life or
experiences; such information is presented as irrelevant to her being a woman, by this view
(Spelman 1988, 158). Women become inessential through this logic because each individual
woman does not add any further understanding to the concept “woman.” One problem I find
with eclipsing such differences is that certain groups of women are systematically made
inessential in more instances than are others. Within “white feminism,” for example, black,
Latina, and biracial women have been consistently made inessential to the category
“woman,” in that “white feminism’s” approach to sexism has ignored race as part of the
sexist experience. Similarly, the “sexism-only” approach has made poor women and lesbians
inessential to the category “woman” by ignoring class and sexuality as part of the sexist
experience. Their stories have not been allowed to shape our conception of womanhood and
more particularly, of women’s experience with sexism. When these groups of women are
shut out from the dominant discourse regarding womanhood, their experiences with sexism
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are not given the credence they deserve. Furthermore, an incomplete conception of sexism
arises; we do not and will not understand sexism the way women suffer from it if we claim
that any one woman will give us a picture of how sexism is experienced that is representative
for all women.
I therefore propose a new feminist methodology: Gender Plus. The systematic
(though perhaps unintentional) exclusion of black women from the category “woman” has
led to a misrepresentative focus of feminism on white women, which has in turn privileged
white women’s concerns and marginalized black women’s concerns. I take issue particularly
with the fact that “white feminism” often ends up being limited to the study of white women
and their experiences with sexist oppression, but has not openly admitted, or even noted, this
fact. In order for Gender Plus to work, both criteria have to be met: at least one level of
inquiry beyond gender must be considered in the study of women and sexist oppression, and
its consideration must be clearly communicated. If the latter criterion is not met, if a
“feminist” theory claims to be about all women, but is really only about white women, it is
on some level false, argue Lugones and Spelman: such a theory is “probably ethnocentric,
and of dubious usefulness except to those whose position in the world it strengthens” (1986,
26). Feminist theorizing must comprise the voices, experiences, and perspectives of women
who have been thus far marginalized by feminist thought. A feminist politics that is more
honest with itself will level the playing field by more accurately evaluating each feminist
theory’s limitations and scope. Lugones and Spelman envision feminist organization,
movement, and theory as needing either explicit qualifiers or real understanding of women
across cultures and situations:
The deck is stacked when one group takes it upon itself to develop the
theory and then have others criticize it. Categories are quick to congeal,
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and the experiences of women whose lives do not fit the categories will
appear as anomalous when in fact the theory should have grown out of
them as much as others from the beginning. This, of course, is why any
organization or conference having to do with “women”—with no
qualification—that seriously does not want to be “solipsistic” will from
the beginning be multi-cultural or state the appropriate qualifications
(Lugones and Spelman 1986, 27).
If feminism really takes as its task the comprehension of women, it must take steps to
understand variance in women’s contexts and cultures, before it can theorize about all
women. This can be accomplished either by studying those groups separately and clearly
stating what separates one group of women from another, or by studying a “multi-cultural”
conglomerate of women and clearly stating which cultures are represented. Both of these
methods accomplish Gender Plus in that the feminists embrace and acknowledge a level of
inquiry beyond race and do so explicitly.
The language of the term “Gender Plus” could be construed to imply an interpretation
of a pool of identifiers, such as gender, race, and class, as the sum of characteristics added
together. Similarly, it could be construed to imply an interpretation of forms of oppression,
such as sexism, racism, and classism, as operating independently and existing together in
women’s lives as additive layers. Rather, “Gender Plus” seeks to highlight the interactions of
these vectors of identity and of oppression, and to communicate their intersection and mutual
construction. As Charlotte Bunch puts it,
the variations on female oppression that women suffer according to race,
class, ethnicity, religion, sexual preference, age, nationality, physical
disability, and so on…are not simply added onto the oppression of women
by sex, but shape the forms by which we experience that subordination.
Thus, we cannot simply add up the types of oppression that a woman
suffers one-by-one as independent factors but must look at how they are
interrelated (1987, 337).
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Along a similar line of reasoning, Kimberle Crenshaw asserts that “the intersectional
experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism” (Crenshaw 1989, 140). The “Plus”
points to the recommendation that feminist theorists acknowledge at least one analogous
factor that co-exists with, and mutually constructs with gender.
I advocate the consideration of women as each a whole person, each an individual
with specific, interrelated struggles. Since some categorization is crucial for identifying
trends in how oppression is manifested, and thus for defining forms of oppression, feminist
thought can realistically only approach accounting for the differences among women. The
more details we know about a person the more we can understand her experience with
oppression, but we must also weigh against this the impracticality of knowing everything
there is to know about all of the women we choose to study. Therefore, feminist thought
should consider at least one further factor in its inquiry and explicitly identify that factor.
Gender Plus presupposes the notion that sexism manifests itself in ways that vary with the
other types of oppression a woman experiences. It asks for more: it asks for pertinent
information to be considered in the study of women, but acknowledges that too small a scope
would hamper a study’s relevance to feminist thought. Therefore, in my discussion on
Gender Plus, I will take race as a further factor beyond gender, and explore some of the ways
in which race and gender, and sexism and racism interact to produce interconnected, or
intersectional realities in women’s experiences. More specifically, I will focus on race and
gender in the experiences of black women in the United States.
One could argue, of course, that feminist theorists already do what I am
recommending, at least in part. That is, “white feminists” studying women do tacitly take
race into account insofar as they discuss their own experiences of whiteness. But by failing
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to acknowledge their focus, they undercut the coherence of their analyses; by acting as if
“white women” are “just” women, rather than acknowledging that they are talking about
“white women,” they deny that race is part of the analysis. Gender Plus requires a self-
conscious and self-critical use of another identity category besides gender. Its approach will
in some ways limit the scale of analysis, but it does so conscientiously, whereas “white
feminists” and “sexism-only feminists” have not acknowledged the boundaries of their scope
or the limited relevance their work has for the many groups of thus inessentialized women.
Black feminist thought, on the other hand, does both, and therefore fully accomplishes
Gender Plus; it examines, self-consciously and purposively, race as well as gender—
particularly the race of black women—and also acknowledges that its primary scope of
inquiry is how sexism and racism intertwine to produce black women’s experiences of
oppression. It does not claim to study how all women experience sexism. Black feminism,
in fact, allows for the study of “white feminism” whereas “white feminism,” understanding
itself as “feminism,” has viewed black feminism as a setback in the movement to unite
“women” against sexist oppression (all the while misinterpreting white women’s experiences
with sexism as all women’s experiences with sexism). By accurately describing its focus,
black feminism invites “white feminists” to do the same—to continue to study how white
women experience oppression. Black feminism and Gender Plus also invite feminist
theorists to choose as their “plus” any factor or form of oppression they perceive to be
operating in concert with gender-based oppression in women’s lives. Yet black feminism
and Gender Plus also expect “white feminism” to follow black feminism’s example and label
itself accurately. I do not quarrel with the usefulness of what the white feminist movement
has accomplished thus far. It has made great strides for white women, a group that certainly
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has experience with sexist oppression, and also for many black women as well, who are able
to access laws against sexual harassment and domestic violence, albeit often with greater
difficulty.
While Gender Plus functions as a broad methodology, a call for a further level of
inquiry without specifying what sort of level, as stated above, my focus in the elaboration of
my theory of Gender Plus will be race, particularly that of black women. I am arguing that
race has significantly shaped the histories of the oppression of black women and of white
women, and that the experiences produced by racial forces differ enough to necessitate
acknowledging those differences in the course of feminist exploration. Gender Plus theory,
however, does much more than add the dimension race to the study of women and gender-
based oppression. I have chosen to use black feminism and its race dimension to
demonstrate how the method of Gender Plus can and must inform feminism. I invite
feminists to choose the level of inquiry they find particularly pertinent to women’s
experiences of oppression and urge that the choice be made explicit. As argued above, black
feminists have overtly chosen to examine race with gender, while “white feminists” have
unknowingly made the same choice. Lesbian feminists explore the forces of heterosexism in
conjunction with sexism and do so openly, while “feminists” have tended to focus on the
struggles of heterosexual women while not being conscious of, or while not admitting that
focus. Feminists may also choose to investigate the effects classism has on the experience of
gender-based oppression. Gender Plus denotes greater specificity than what has often come
before from theorists positing themselves as “feminists.” It does not fear the creation of
divisions within the category “woman” because such divisions already exist; it rather takes
the first step in understanding differences, and in discovering the ways in which that
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understanding illuminates the difficulties women face. Spelman, in her warning against the
essentialization of the category “woman,” and the resulting inessentialization of groups of
women, sees what I am calling Gender Plus as necessary:
Being a woman, as we surely know by now from cross-cultural studies, is
something that is constructed by societies and differs from one society to
another. Hence unless I know something more about two women than the
fact that they are women, I can’t say anything about what they might have
in common (1988, 136).
While women will not come together as a whole category until Gender Plus is achieved in
feminist discourse, and feminists can begin to study what women might have in common
across races or sexualities or classes, nothing is lost, because this theory does not disband
women. Rather, it acknowledges that the category “woman” does not include all women yet,
that certain groups of women have been systematically left out. Indeed, the very forces that
have oppressed those women within “feminism” are those that must be accounted for in
Gender Plus methodology.
Spelman proposes an imagery schema that can be used as a framework for enacting
Gender Plus in practice: banks of doors form consecutive barriers, each labeled with an
identifier such as “woman,” “man,” “Afro-American,” “Asian-American,” etc. (1988, 144).
The doors are divided into banks according to the type of identifier they label, such as gender
preceding race preceding class, etc. Whether the gender doors precede the race doors or vice
versa, is at issue for this theorization of Gender Plus. If first, everyone is made to cross
through either a door marked “woman” or a door marked “man” before crossing through a
race category door, the implication is that there exists a category “woman” outside of racial
differences. If, on the other hand, the race doors come before the gender doors, then people
must divide themselves along racial lines before gender lines; this suggests that a category
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“African-American” can exist before considerations of gender come into play. For feminists
studying women and experiences of gender-based oppression, the schema in which gender
precedes race is more applicable, but it must be approached with care. While there may be
something that all women have in common which distinguishes them from men, feminists
have not yet identified it because they have not extended their scope to include the next bank
of doors, the further level of inquiry. Once women are all grouped together, there remain
features which distinguish among them, and many of these are important for understanding
their experiences of oppression. Gender Plus methodology begins with women and then
discovers more about those women by studying divisions among them, for example, along
racial lines, in order to understand better the struggles they face. If life presents different
challenges beyond the “woman” and “Euro-American” doors from beyond the “woman” and
“Afro-American” doors, then feminists will be a step closer to recognizing how the forces of
sexism, racism, and racial advantage have impact on the lives of women. Dorothy Roberts,
Angela Davis, Patricia Hill Collins, and bell hooks have taken this step and have explored
many of the ways in which those forces affect black women’s experiences of oppression, and
their doing so demonstrates that Gender Plus methodology enables a less partial and less
perverse study of women and gender-based oppression.
Gender Plus takes the first step in the self-conscious, transparent inquiry into
women’s lives and how women experience oppression. It does not presume to outline a
politics through which women of varying races, sexualities, or classes come back together to
unify their voices at the end of this interim. It highlights the importance, in fact, of not
presuming what will happen when white feminist theorists begin calling themselves just that,
and framing their investigations into the lives of white women as limited, specific studies
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toward learning how sexism and race privilege interact to produce that group’s experiences.
Differences in experience that are due to the intersection of one’s sex and one’s race, for
example, must be made clear before a holistic feminism can be pursued; Gender Plus only
rolls back the study of women to the extent that it seeks to leave no flesh and blood women
behind. It includes more women into the category “woman” and into the study of feminism.
Gender Plus requires that theorists investigate contexts that are more specific than “all
women,” and that they recognize the limitations of the contexts they choose before they draw
conclusions. It posits the idea that conclusions that will then be drawn will be less partial and
less perverse than if theorists were to claim to study all women, and, in turn, it will contribute
more to feminism. The aim of feminism cannot be achieved without Gender Plus because it
mitigates socially constructed biases by bringing deemphasized issues to the surface,
especially when those issues have served to further the advantage of one group of women
over another.
Another way to view the purpose of Gender Plus is through comparison with Nancie
Caraway’s (1991) multicultural feminism. She envisions a sort of arena in which feminists
of different backgrounds can learn from each other’s stories and question each other as
equals and colleagues (1991, 199). Acknowledging that feminists’ interests and concerns are
as varied as all women’s, and that those differences have led to divisions among feminists,
Caraway aims for what she refers to as a more mature camaraderie, “solidarity,” than the
often-aspired-to ideal of “sisterhood” (1991, 201). For this endeavor, Caraway identifies
“the first principle of multicultural feminism: accountability” (1991, 179). This principle is
necessary for feminists engaging in debate with other feminists of backgrounds different
from their own, because part of the process of learning from one another can be initial
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misreadings of others’ experiences. Caraway adds that “in a culture of white privilege, this
condition [of accountability] imposes a greater burden on white feminists to take the first step
toward making things right” (1991, 179). Gender Plus hopes for a similar type of exchange
among feminists and feminisms associated with “pluses,” such as black feminism, Latina
feminism, lesbian feminism, etc., and also looks for “white feminists” to take the step of
following black feminism’s example, and describe their own scope and purpose more
accurately. Iris Young criticizes the desire for community, arguing that it should be
distrusted because “it denies difference in the concrete sense of making it difficult for people
to respect those with whom they do not identify,” and that therefore “the desire for mutual
understanding and reciprocity underlying the ideal of community is similar to the desire for
identification that underlies racial and ethnic chauvinism” (1990, 311). Analogous to this
argument is Caraway’s criticism of “sisterhood,” that it has “been marked
by…tendencies…which have disadvantaged women of color” (1991, 199). “White
feminists” have sought to use the term “sisterhood” in order to gain political support for
feminism among women of color and thereby to construct community. They have hoped to
convey the notion that all women are in the struggle against sexism together, but the term
“sisterhood,” and the way in which “community” has grown out of it, has actually functioned
as a cover-up for the tendency of “white feminists” to emphasize their own concerns over
against those of women of color. While Audre Lorde sees great importance and potential in
“community,” she, too, warns against imposed or assumed homogeneity, both of which can
be detrimental: “Without community, there is no liberation, only the most vulnerable and
temporary armistice between an individual and her oppression. But community must not
mean a shedding of our differences, nor the pathetic pretense that these differences do not
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exist” (1981, 99). Similarly, Tessie Liu describes how the assertion of “community” or of
“sisterhood” is a “quick achievement of solidarity [which] comes at the expense of a real
examination of the nature of the connections that actually do exist, by virtue of the fact that
we occupy different positions in [the] world” (1994, 574). These theorists emphasize the
importance of acknowledging the reality of differences as fundamental to an inclusive, and
thereby more effective movement.
Caraway’s multicultural feminism, like Gender Plus, has the goal of a more inclusive,
less partial feminism. However, Caraway does not go far enough. She breaks down and
examines the concept “sisterhood” to show how it has really functioned politically, and calls
for a method of interaction in which feminists retain the differences that make them who they
are, while relating to one another as colleagues, but she does not prescribe a way for
feminists to ensure that they are equipped to interact effectively with feminists of different
backgrounds. She cites theories of Bettina Aptheker (1989) and Elsa Barkley Brown (1989)
as ways of imagining struggles that one has not experienced oneself, but that one’s peer
feminists have experienced. Aptheker describes a framework through which a white feminist
can consider the experiences of women of color, and do so outside of a white-centered
context:
I wanted a grounding upon which the center could pivot to include the
experiences of Afro-American, Asian-American, Native American, Latina,
Chicana, and Euro-American women, and the diversity within and
between them. Essential to my purpose was the shedding of a whitened
center in conception and design…I also sought connection, as long as the
connection remained respectful of the difference and became a point of
illumination rather than a mush of obfuscation in a white, ethnocentric,
heterocentric landscape (1989, 12).
Her method of “pivoting the center” does not make meaningless “white feminists’” concerns
or contributions. Rather, it makes room for the very multicultural solidarity to which
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Caraway aspires; women of varying experiences and outlooks can come together and share in
a space safe from the power dynamics of racism and race privilege. Brown utilizes
Aptheker’s framework in her study of how to teach a more aware, more inclusive women’s
history:
I do not mean that white or male students can learn to feel what it is like to
be a Black woman. Rather, I believe that all people can learn to center in
another experience, validate it, and judge it by its own standards without
need of comparison or need to adopt that framework as their own. Thus,
one has no need to ‘decenter’ anyone in order to center someone else, one
has only to constantly, appropriately, ‘pivot the center’ (1989, 922).
Brown points to the equality of exchange inherent in “pivoting the center.” There is a space
which used to be occupied by white women of race privilege, but that, once pivoted, becomes
neutral. In other words, awareness, acceptance, and understanding do not have to be zero-
sum games. In Brown’s example, black women, too, can occupy the center, and those
seeking to learn from black women’s experiences create a space in their minds in which they
imagine those experiences without fitting them into biased frameworks.
These notions of “pivoting the center” and imagining another’s experiences without
judgment or comparison are useful ways of describing what will be made possible with
Gender Plus. They and Caraway’s multicultural feminist politics of solidarity are meaningful
ends, but absent from their discussion is a clear means to those ends. Gender Plus fills that
void. Imagining oppression that one has not experienced, or in which one has perhaps been
complicit, and doing so in a diverse collective of women is an articulation of the process
toward a feminism that does not systematically exclude or obfuscate the experiences of
particular groups of women. Gender Plus will in practice ensure that such a neutral space
can be located through pivoting the center. Its prerequisite that feminist theorists discover
and master an understanding of women’s experiences of oppression by narrowing their focus
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slightly and explicitly is the first step toward leveling the playing field in feminist discourse.
“White feminism,” for example, will exist as it is and will no longer purport to be
“feminism.” It will follow that “white feminism” is as important to an understanding of a
more holistic feminism as black feminism and Chicana feminism. Only when Gender Plus is
achieved can a neutral center be found, and can feminists of varying cultures and
perspectives come together and debate within it.
Gender Plus has two objectives regarding feminism. Besides working toward greater
discursive inclusiveness, it also functions to expand feminism’s knowledge of women. It can
both stunt the racism fed by an emphasis on white women’s experiences, for example, and
expand knowledge of women’s experiences. The practice of this methodology can curb a
social ill in the context of feminism and not just allow, but enact, a greater understanding of
women and their experiences of oppression. Black feminist theorists who engage in Gender
Plus both clarify the functions of racism and sexism in the world as well as in feminism, and
augment what is known about how women experience oppression. In the following chapter,
I will explore how some black feminists have gone about enacting Gender Plus.
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Part III: Black Feminism and Intersectionality
The most general statement of our politics at the present time would be that we are actively
committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression and see as
our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact
that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions
creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical
political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of
color face (The Combahee River Collective 1981).
Black feminism gives voice to many of the salient issues and struggles faced by black
women, who have been silenced historically by both the feminist movement and the
antiracist movement. Black feminism also brings to light some heretofore hidden
assumptions of feminism. For instance, gender ideology, one of the very notions upon which
“white feminism” rests, is called into question by a black feminist reading. Feminism’s fight
against sexism assumes that women are socially constructed in such a way that allows for
their subordination, and that men are socially constructed in such a way that allows for their
dominance. Collins (2005) shows that gender ideology is more complex than that. She
argues that there is a dominant gender ideology and that there is also a black gender ideology
which, by its very definition, provides for the subordination of both black men and women.
Collins describes the dominant ideology with the terms “hegemonic masculinity” and
“hegemonic femininity.” For men, hegemonic masculinity consists in being “strong” and in
having power over both women and various groups of men. It is relational in nature, in that
it is defined in “opposition to women, boys, poor and working class men of all races and
ethnicities, gay men, and Black men” (Collins 2005, 186). Hegemonic masculinity depends
not only on the existence of these other groups, but also on their social and political
subordination to hegemonic males. A social hierarchy of dominant and subordinated males,
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or “successful and failed manhood” (Collins 2005, 187), is stacked by racial categories
through racist bias, insofar as a central part of being a hegemonic male is enjoying racial
privilege, i.e., not experiencing oppression due to racism. This positions white, middle- and
upper-class, heterosexual men at the top of the gender hierarchy. Below them, in power,
influence, and masculinity, are all remaining men. Furthermore, the way in which we
understand the relationships among masculinities is predicated by “all women occupy[ing]
the category of devalued Other” (2005, 187), Collins argues.
For women, hegemonic femininity first exists as a complement to hegemonic
masculinity: while hegemonic masculinity calls for strong, provider and protector males,
hegemonic femininity calls for weak, demure and vulnerable females (Collins 2005, 194).
There is a second dimension to hegemonic femininity, however. Collins argues that
femininity is not something to be earned like masculinity (by “having sex with a woman,
bringing home a paycheck, or demonstrating athletic prowess,” [Collins 2005, 194]), but is
rather something to display, something more passive in nature, and that it is centrally
concerned with women’s bodies3. She contends that the physical aspects of hegemonic
femininity make femininity, as it is understood in this construct, impossible for most black
women to achieve: “[h]istorically, in the American context, young women with milky White
skin, long blond hair, and slim figures were deemed to be the most beautiful and therefore the
most feminine women” (2005, 194). Fundamental to this ideology of femininity, then, is the
exclusion of black women. Besides the physical attributes associated with this notion of
femininity, the attitudinal attributes also have a racial slant: “because they were employed
outside the home and brought home their own independent income, [black women]
3 This argument by Collins does not acknowledge the ways in which women can be seen to “earn” femininity
by giving birth, by mothering, and by providing care in contexts other than mothering. Femininity is thus not
completely passive, but can legitimately be described as “centrally concerned with women’s bodies.”
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seemingly usurped Black male authority within Black families” (Collins 2005, 199). A
demure demeanor and attitudinal subordination vis-à-vis males implies a lack of authority.
Black women have not had that lack of authority, given their history of supporting
themselves economically.
The dominant notions of femininity in American culture have many more dimensions
than just gender. This notion of race and gender follows from the racial dimension of gender
in the hegemonic concept of femininity; differences in how women experience daily life,
such as whether they work, or have to work, or stay home, are often raced. In this way,
gender is racialized. It is useful to consider one or several of these other dimensions—race,
class, sexuality, etc.—in concert with gender in the study of gender ideology, and in creating
feminist scholarship; doing so can bring to the surface the complexity that already exists in
the reality of femininity. This black feminist work by Collins frames the concept of
femininity in such a way as to illuminate the biases that infuse its hegemonic ideology and, in
turn, create it as an exclusive concept.
As a less perverse alternative to hegemonic femininity and masculinity, Collins calls
for the development of a “progressive Black sexual politics” that “reject[s] sexism and
heterosexism and that…[is] sensitive to economic, political, and social contours of the new
racism” (2005, 184). With the term “the new racism,” Collins refers to the racism of the
post-Civil Rights era in the U.S., a racism that is de facto rather than de jure, but that is
nearly institutionalized, given its consistency. It is more subtle and less acknowledged, but it
remains damaging to African-Americans. “The new racism” permeates U.S. culture and can
be characterized by a “radical form of passivity” called “dis-engagement,” in which whites
see only through the lens of their own culture, yet assume theirs is the only culture (Lugones
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1990, 51); ethnocentric racism objectifies and subordinates black people while making that
subordination invisible. This form of racism is “new” because it reflects traditional forms of
racism, such as colonialism and slavery, but its manifestations are modern, such as “poor
housing, poor health, illiteracy, [and] unemployment” (Collins 2005, 55). Central to an
antiracist movement today is a new black sexual politics that opposes the damaging forces of
the new racism, one of which is subordination—of women in some instances, and of men in
some instances. Furthermore, such a black sexual politics rejects fundamentally the
problematic exclusion of black men and women by the notion of hegemonic masculinity and
femininity: the “weak men, strong women” thesis seems to accuse black women of resisting
dominant gender ideology, and black men of not being able to subordinate black women
(Collins 2005, 182). Indeed, many antiracist policies of recent decades have centered on a
need for African-Americans to assimilate to middle-class, white, hegemonic gender ideology,
in other words, a need to strengthen “weak” black men and an implied need to weaken
“strong” black women (Collins 2005, 183). Insofar as “Black femininity is constructed in
relation to the tenets of hegemonic masculinity that subordinates all femininities to
masculinity” (Collins 2005, 187), social and cultural concern about black men and women
operating outside of hegemonic gender norms arise from sexist and racist biases, and they
serve to undermine “one of the few positive images used to describe Black femininity”
(Collins 2005, 205). Therefore, a more careful study shows that it is necessary to develop a
progressive black sexual politics that has as its central tenet the subordination of no one
(Collins 2005, 7).
Such a politics will also take into account the day-to-day issues of femininity that
concern black women, and that are often quite different from those that concern white
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women. In another work, Collins discusses how some of the first black feminists to organize,
such as those of the National Black Feminist Organization of the early 1970s, came together
to discuss:
the politics of appearance, especially the effects of skin color and hair
texture on Black women’s self-images and how others treated them,…the
greater mobility of White women in job settings, the lack of housing, the
prevalence of rape and crime in Black communities, the burdens of the
matriarchy thesis, and the myths of Black women’s promiscuity (2006,
166).
Black femininity is socially constructed on the outskirts of hegemonic femininity, a
positioning which arises out of racist notions of what is appealing in the female sex. The
issues of femininity that black women face, therefore, often have to do with that exclusion
and that racism. If hegemonic femininity denotes a certain hair and skin type that black
women do not have, then their experiences with those aspects of femininity are likely to be
pertinent both to their experiences with sexism and their experiences with racism; hair
texture and skin type thus become black feminist issues. The same is true of the matriarchy
thesis and of black women’s promiscuity. Both are theorized in opposition to hegemonic
femininity. The lack of housing and the prevalence of rape and crime in black communities
are linked to economic and political aspects of the “new racism,” and become central
concerns for the women living under those conditions. Each of these issues is important to a
black sexual politics that subordinates no one in that each is related to the intersection of the
oppressive forces of sexism and racism in black women’s lives.
A progressive black sexual politics arises not from the bias of race privilege, but
from the less perverse perspective of black women. More fully aware that pervasive
American notions of gender are simply another face of an exclusionist dominant gender
ideology, black feminists can rethink what is so often taken as given—that femininity
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consists in economic dependence, whiteness, and political subordination, and that
masculinity consists in economic independence, whiteness, and political dominance. Then,
they can use realities of black women’s experiences to develop a more self-aware, positive,
inclusive politics. Collins has engaged in Gender Plus, as I am calling it, by analyzing the
forces of race and gender which are present and active in the dominant gender ideology,
interpreting them, and acknowledging their roles in the oppression of women.
Similarly, Crenshaw (1991) seeks to bring to light a set of circumstances in which
both race and gender biases effectively marginalize women of color. The concept she calls
“intersectionality” describes the interrelatedness and mutual construction of race and gender.
It points to “the multidimensionality of Black women’s experience,” for which the “single-
axis framework that is…reflected in feminist theory and antiracist politics” is insufficient,
and which that framework can distort (Crenshaw 1989, 139). Through a study of
intersectionality, and of battering and rape of women of color, she draws the conclusion that
such experiences of women of color are affected by intersecting forces of race and gender,
and furthermore, that antiracist and feminist policies have not effectively challenged those
forces as a combination. Crenshaw argues that, while racist and sexist forces regularly
intersect in the lives of women, they are not regularly recognized as doing so in antiracist or
in feminist efforts (1991, 1242). Indeed, she cites, as does hooks, the same tendency toward
the exclusion of black women from the groups “black people,” and “women,” characteristic
of discourse that pits the two groups as separate entities without overlap: “when…[antiracist
and feminist] practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an either/or
proposition, they relegate the identity of women of color to a location that resists telling”
(Crenshaw 1991, 1242).
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The marginalization of women of color in the arena of battering and rape manifests
itself in a variety of ways. Of particular pertinence to this article is a societal resistance to
raising awareness about violence against women of color. Even among victims’ advocates—
activists, police—concern has been expressed that making known statistics regarding these
crimes in minority communities could have several negative consequences for minorities in
general, and for the victims themselves (Crenshaw 1991, 1253). Crenshaw encountered the
following responses when she sought such statistics from the Los Angeles Police
Department:
Domestic violence activists both within and outside the Department feared
that statistics reflecting the extent of domestic violence in minority
communities might be selectively interpreted and publicized so as to
undermine long-term efforts to force the Department to address domestic
violence as a serious problem.
[A]ctivists were worried that the statistics might permit opponents to
dismiss domestic violence as a minority problem and, therefore, not
deserving of aggressive action.
Representatives from various minority communities opposed the release of
these statistics. They were concerned, apparently, that data would unfairly
represent Black and Brown communities as unusually violent, potentially
reinforcing stereotypes that might be used in attempts to justify oppressive
police tactics and other discriminatory practices (1991, 1253).
People already dedicated to prosecuting and eradicating domestic violence, as well as people
employed to uphold the law against domestic violence, exhibit here a reluctance to contribute
to increased awareness and analysis of domestic violence against women of color. Sexism
and racism together operate in both of these positions, and in the assumed outcome of the
release of any statistics. The position of the activists, both within and outside the L.A.P.D.,
points to the probability that information regarding domestic violence in minority
communities will be readily misunderstood or misapplied. Activists argue that it could
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undercut the already shaky credence given to domestic violence as a serious problem, but
such an argument neglects the fact that the lack of awareness and understanding of the issues
associated with domestic violence among minorities is itself problematic. The very reason
Crenshaw sought this information was presented as justification for its denial.
The activists take a second position, which argues that racist bias tends to generalize
the behaviors of one member of a racial group to all members of that racial group. They
claim that such a concern justifies avoiding the acknowledgment that domestic violence even
exists in minority communities, for fear that the acknowledgment itself could have the
potential to serve as fodder for this common practice of stereotyping. Furthermore, this
position takes as a given that such a stereotype would depreciate the very importance of
combating domestic violence. The fact that racist bias might express itself in response to
information about crime in minority communities does not justify suppressing that
information; racism cannot be used as a reason not to prosecute crimes committed by people
of color. Law enforcement must consistently prosecute violent crimes in any organized
society, and ignoring those crimes also ignores their victims, often themselves people of
color.
Moreover, it is sexist on its face to suggest that any perspective on domestic violence
could decrease the very need to address it. Domestic violence remains a violent crime, and
the fact that women are most commonly its victims seems, by this view, to open it up to the
possibility that it be deemed unimportant. The more particular suggestion that a “minority
problem,” or in this case a crime whose victims tend to be people of color, deserves less
attention, is racist. Perhaps the domestic violence activists could respond by saying that if
police and legislators think domestic violence is a “black problem,” they will be less likely to
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devote funding and resources to fighting it; rather, if they can be convinced that it is a “white
problem,” domestic violence might get more attention as a serious issue among those best
equipped to fight it. This response points to a different way in which racism operates within
the issue of domestic violence. Suppressing information about a crime because its victims
tend to be women is sexist, and suppressing information about a crime whose victims tend to
be non-white, is racist. Women of color who are victims of domestic violence live at the
intersection of sexist forces that impede effective law enforcement against crimes against
women, and of racist forces that impede effective law enforcement against crimes chiefly
perpetrated against people of color.
These issues of race and domestic violence testify that even the best intentioned
whites exhibit racism without even realizing it. The lack of realization is made possible by
the ostensible focus on “women,” without regard to race, in the movement to end domestic
violence, which in effect translates into a focus on white women. The representatives from
minority communities exhibit the sexism characteristic of some antiracist practices, which
marginalize women of color. Central to their position is an assumption that racism affects
the perpetrators of these crimes rather than the victims. Crenshaw sought data specifically
from minority precincts because, according to G. Chezia Carraway, rarely do statistics about
violence against women break down data by race (Carraway 1991, 1305), and Crenshaw
reasoned that studying data by precinct would give her an idea of arrests by racial group,
since Los Angeles is comparatively racially segregated (Crenshaw 1991, 1252). Given that
“nine out of ten violent victimizations of African-American women [are] committed by
African-American men” (Maxwell et al. 2003, 534), holding a position that affects how
violence against women by men of color is handled, affects to almost the same extent, how
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violent experiences of women of color are handled. Suppressing information, or neglecting
to collect information, about violence against women by men of color effectively
deemphasizes many of the violent experiences of women of color. This is a kind of racism in
itself, one that is informed and shaped by, and one that also informs and shapes, the sexism
that devalues a serious approach to violent crimes against women. This position argues that
certain crimes can legitimately be ignored because addressing them might negatively affect
the perpetrators; it therefore undermines the gravity of the victims’ experiences, which
should take priority. Furthermore, it assumes that the victims are not already subjected to
racism in the criminal justice system, an assumption that is demonstrably invalid. For
example, Bullock (1961) found that typically intra-racial crimes, such as sexual assault,
committed by African-Americans, are adjudicated less severely than typically interracial
crimes, such as robbery, committed by African-Americans. In other words, African-
Americans who commit crimes against other African-Americans receive more lenience from
the criminal justice system than African-Americans who commit crimes against people of
other races. Similarly, Maxwell et al. found that
African-Americans convicted for rape serving time in state prisons were
more likely to state that their victims were White (68 percent) than
African-American (28 percent)…Given that only 15 percent of White
sexual assault victims reported the race of their offender as African-
American…and that the majority of African-American sex offenders were
serving time for victimizing White women, the evidence seems to suggest
that African-American sexual assault victims receive less protection from
the criminal justice system than White victims (2003, 534).
This suggests, first, that the victim’s race can have an impact on the outcome of violent crime
adjudication, and second, that the criminal justice system particularly devalues black women.
Incidents from 1989 support these statistics. In April, a white woman jogging in Central
Park was brutally raped and beaten. The horrific crime received widespread media coverage
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and the perpetrators were generally thought to be a group of black and Latino adolescent
boys. The races of the victim and the rapists seem to have had an impact on media coverage
and the societal panic that followed, because less than two weeks later, a black woman was
raped and thrown from the roof of a 4-story apartment building in Brooklyn (Carraway 1991,
1304), and no comparable reaction followed. And during the same week that the jogger was
raped in Central Park, 28 other rapes were reported in New York City (Terry 1989). In most
of these cases, the victims were women of color, and none of these received the kind of
media attention that the jogger did. According to Carraway, most rape victims are the same
race as their attackers (1991, 1303). Therefore, one explanation for the lack of media
coverage of the black woman in Brooklyn, and of the other 28, is the race of the victims
relative to the race of their attackers. Many of the suspected boys of color in the jogger case
served lengthy jail sentences before a serial rapist came forward 12 years later and confessed
to having committed the crime (Collins 2005, 103).
In this instance, minority community advocates were almost certainly concerned with
the media coverage of the jogger rape and the suspects. Collins argues that terms used in the
media to refer to the suspects, such as “roving bands” and “wolf pack” (2005, 103), inflamed
stereotypical images of “the black male rapist.” Donald Trump’s full page ad in the New
York Times following the crime demanded that New York “Bring Back the Death Penalty,
Bring Back Our Police” and was seen as a parallel to past sensationalizing of violent crimes
that frequently ended in lynchings of black suspects (Crenshaw 1991, 1267). While these
images and their ensuing horrors are extremely troubling, Crenshaw argues that antiracist
policies committed to fighting them can have the effect of devaluing black women:
Antiracist critiques of rape law focus on how the law operates primarily to
condemn rapes of white women by Black men. While the heightened
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concern with protecting white women against Black men has been
primarily criticized as a form of discrimination against Black men, it just
as surely reflects devaluation of Black women…To the extent rape of
Black women is thought to dramatize racism, it is usually cast as an
assault on Black manhood, demonstrating his inability to protect Black
women. The direct assault on Black womanhood is less frequently seen as
an assault on the Black community (1991, 1272-73).
The origin and persistence of the “black male rapist” myth have stemmed from a fear for the
safety of white women, and have ignored four important realities: first, although this myth
was used as a tool to rally whites around the practice of lynching, rape was only rarely
alleged in those cases (Crenshaw 1991, 1272); second, as Carraway points out, in the vast
majority of rape cases, the victim and the rapist are the same race (Carraway 1991, 1303);
third, “statistics show that Black women are more likely to be raped than Black men are to be
falsely accused of it” (Crenshaw 1991, 1274); and fourth, black women are significantly
more likely to be raped than white women (Ostrow, 1985). In other words, black men who
have raped women have more likely than not raped black women, but it is not these
narratives that draw a response from minority activists, antirape activists, society more
generally, or the criminal justice system.
Women of color’s experiences with violence are, argues Crenshaw, in many instances
“erased” by the intersecting forces of racism and sexism. The erasure of these experiences
also seems to result from a consensus of odd political bedfellows; people of color and
domestic violence activists (those advocating the suppression of the Los Angeles statistics)
join with those who arrest, charge, try, and sentence violent criminals in discounting the
voices and experiences of women of color. Are not women the very people domestic
violence activists and the criminal justice system aim to protect in these cases? Are not
people of color the very people whose rights and liberties minority community activists seek
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to defend? Would it not, then, be logical to assume that women of color might benefit from
the support and advocacy of many different groups? It is instead the case that, when women
of color, people who fit into both of these categories, comprise the group in need of
protection and defense, the support collapses. We may attribute this phenomenon, again, to
the presence of a racist bias in the feminist movement and the attendant presence of a sexist
bias in the antiracist movement, and also to the presence of both racism and sexism in the
criminal justice system, and in society more generally. As G. Chezia Carraway (1991)
argues, however, there is hope in the work being done to make more visible the violence
against women of color. Such efforts insist on finding, and making public, information about
the experiences of women of color, and thus they oppose the forces that marginalize those
experiences.
After analyzing and interpreting experiences that have been thus far marginalized,
black feminists create theories that account for the intersecting forces which produce the
context and substance of black women’s experiences. This phase is crucial, because “[w]hat
is considered theory in the dominant academic community is not necessarily what counts as
theory for women-of-color,” argues Anzaldúa (1990, xxv). Black women need theories “that
will rewrite history using race, class, gender and ethnicity as categories of analysis”
(Anzaldúa 1990, xxv). Anzaldúa endorses what I am calling Gender Plus insofar as she calls
for further levels of analysis beyond gender. Theories relevant for women of color, and for
black feminism, must seek to understand the forces that shape their lives. Like Crenshaw,
Collins sees the oppression of U.S. black women as the intersection of mutually constructing
forces (Collins 2000, 5). Race-based, gender-based, class-based forms of oppression
highlight societal responses to aspects of black women’s identities. How society treats black
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women is intimately tied to who they are. In “A Black Feminist Statement,” The Combahee
River Collective writes about the study of black feminism and its ties to identity politics:
“[w]e believe that the most profound and potentially the most radical politics come directly
out of our own identity” (1981, 212). Intersecting identities can result in intersecting
oppressions, insofar as those identities are each associated with a form of oppression.
Everyone has a race, a gender, a class, a sexuality, etc., but only for specific groups of people
do those identities make them targets of oppression. For black women in the United States,
their race, their gender, often their class, and for some, their sexuality, all make them targets
of different forms of oppression. Experiences of oppression, however, are complex, and
separating one form of oppression from another is often impossible. Is it racism or sexism
that devalues black women in the eyes of the criminal justice system? If both are at work,
which one is responsible for which aspects of the devaluation experience? While the sexism
of some antiracist policies and the racism of some feminist policies can explain the actions of
their respective advocates, they become blurred and interconnected within black women’s
experiences.
The exclusion and subordination of black women through the dominant conception of
femininity, and the devaluation of black women by the criminal justice system, are two
examples of the ways in which black women’s experiences differ markedly from those of
white women. Another example is the history of the birth control movement in the U.S.,
discussed in brief in Part I, and its close ties to the racist foundations of the eugenics
movement.
Dorothy Roberts shows that the birth control movement arose in the United States as
a feminist cause which promoted reproductive freedom and autonomy for women (1997, 52).
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From the turn of the century through the 1920s when this movement had its beginnings,
however, it met with opposition from many Americans who continued to associate
reproduction with the duties of womanhood; reproductive autonomy was considered radical
and even rebellious, and did not receive the necessary popular support to serve as the
ideological basis for the dissemination of birth control. Instead, the movement’s leader,
Margaret Sanger, turned to “the more gender-neutral goal of family planning and population
control” (Roberts 1997, 58). Ideologically, this connected the birth control movement with
the eugenics movement of the era, and The American Birth Control League began to promote
the use of birth control among the “socially unfit” (Roberts 1997, 75). The link to eugenics
gave the birth control movement a racist quality, argues Roberts; although eugenics was most
commonly directed at whites, the principles of eugenics were racist in origin. The theories
used to justify Nazi sterilization of German Jews in the 1930s, and European and American
enslavement and colonization of Africans, or “the science of improving stock” (Roberts
1997, 59), were the same theories used to justify the practice of eugenics in the United States
(Roberts 1997, 61). Black Americans involved in the birth control movement viewed its
purpose very differently. Indeed, birth control as a means for racial improvement had a
different meaning for blacks than for whites:
The leading Blacks in the birth control movement never presented
contraception as a means of eliminating hereditary defects; rather, birth
control addressed problems such as high maternal and infant mortality
rates that resulted from social and economic barriers. [W. E. B.] Du Bois
and other Blacks active in the birth control movement adamantly opposed
sterilization, the chief tool of eugenicists (Roberts 1997, 86).
In some cases, white women activists in the birth control movement sought to gain political
ground among white Americans by allying themselves with eugenicist ideals, and sought to
promote such ideals in ways that regarded black women as part of the “socially unfit.” Black
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women activists in the birth control movement, on the other hand, faced the task of
convincing black Americans that birth control was not aimed at “racial suicide” by
decreasing their numbers, but could rather serve to aid poor, black women in exerting more
control over their lives under the harsh conditions of poverty and substandard health care.
It can perhaps be concluded that when activists first pushed for birth control as a
means of reproductive freedom, they had in mind reproductive freedom for white women of
the middle and upper classes, who also otherwise fit the bill for being considered socially fit
(i.e. of a certain level of intelligence as well as mental and physical health). And when such
activists altered the ideological framework for the promotion of birth control, they embraced
a racist, classist, and otherwise prejudiced ideology, which would facilitate the success of the
movement. Black women activists’ experiences with the birth control movement in this era,
then, were in part shaped by their own views of what contraception could mean for black
women and the particular struggles they faced, but also in part by the eugenicist politics of
the movement, which were in turn an expression of racism and classism, etc., because much
of the movement’s leadership continued to be predominantly white.
The eugenicist tie to the birth control movement, and the disproportionate sterilization
of black women in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s (see Part I, pp. 6-7), argues Roberts, are
symptomatic of a greater problem: “the devaluation of Black reproduction” (1997, 246).
Roberts adds another trend to this list: the promotion of temporary sterilization among black
women.
In more recent decades, methods of contraception have been developed that are
longer-acting and do not have to be administered for each sexual encounter or even daily. In
1990, the FDA approved Norplant for marketing. It is a contraceptive drug in the form of 6
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small tubes that are surgically inserted into a woman’s arm and remain there for 5 years,
slowly releasing progestin into the blood stream (Roberts 1997, 105). Its 99% efficacy rate
makes it essentially a form of temporary sterilization (Roberts 1997, 106). Roberts contends
that state sponsored programs, such as Medicaid and AFDC, specifically targeted black
women for Norplant implantations in the 1990s:
Although most families on welfare are not Black, Blacks
disproportionately rely on welfare to support their children. Black women
are only 6 percent of the population, but they represent a third of AFDC
recipients. The concentration of Black welfare recipients is even greater
in the nation’s inner cities, where Norplant has primarily been dispensed.
For example, in Baltimore, the site of a government campaign to distribute
Norplant, 86 percent of women receiving welfare are Black…Welfare
programs have a greater direct impact on the status of Black people as a
whole [than on that of white people as a whole] (Roberts 1997, 111).
These efforts came at a time when state and federal elected officials sought to cut rather than
expand programs for the poor (Roberts 1997, 108). Although Norplant’s initial appeal
seemed to be greater reproductive freedom given its low maintenance requirements, the state
designed a new social welfare policy to encourage its use among recipients by making it free
through Medicaid. In that “class distinctions are racialized, race and class are inextricably
linked in the development of welfare policy” (Roberts 1997, 110). Thus, when legislators
supported distribution of this form of contraception among the nation’s poor, their appeal
was likely laced with racist notions that overestimate the percentage of women on welfare
who are black (while, at one third, the percentage is disproportionate, more welfare recipients
are white than black), and assume that poor, black women are insufficient mothers. This
argument, like those used in favor of birth control dissemination among poor, black women,
is arguably also linked historically to the philosophy of the U.S. eugenics movement (Roberts
1997, 142). From these assumptions, argues Roberts, policy makers then ushered black
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women’s bodies into socially and politically regulated space; they debated over how best to
go about instituting such regulation—incentives or mandates—but did not include questions
of black women’s autonomy over their own bodies and their own reproduction in the
discussion (1997, 138). The implication that reproduction should be regulated at the hands of
the state is generally a sexist notion, and flies in the face of women’s reproductive autonomy.
While there is something to the argument that some government incentives reasonably
encourage people to act in the public interest, the assumption that curbing poor, black
women’s reproduction will solve social problems, such as poverty, misinterprets the
structural source of such problems (Roberts 1997, 137-38); black people are not
disproportionately poor because of the number of children they have. Indeed, from data
compiled during the summer of 1993, statistics show that black women recipients of AFDC
“do not have significantly more children than their white counterparts” (Bureau of the
Census Statistical Brief, 1995).
State policies regarding the distribution of Norplant were both racist and ineffectively
directed. Public health care workers particularly encouraged the use of Norplant in areas
with high density black populations. Doing so, policy makers argued, was an effective
means of reducing overall state support of children whose parents could not afford to care for
them, and the perpetuation of social problems prevalent among black Americans. To enact
policies specifically designed for the purpose of decreasing, or temporarily halting, the
fertility of black women, is an expression of intersectional oppression. State control over
reproduction is in direct conflict with reproductive autonomy; the assumption that social
problems such as poverty are caused by actions of poor, black people themselves instead of
structural forces, unfoundedly attributes blame to black victims; and targeting poor people as
56
subjects for temporary sterilization denotes the classism and racism central to the eugenics
movement.
Just as Roberts asserts that policy makers mistakenly assume black women’s
reproduction to be the cause of social ills predominant in black communities, Collins (2005)
argues that hegemonic gender ideology gives root to the faulty notion that black people could
counteract such social ills by simply adopting certain aspects of masculinity and femininity.
In the context of the new racism, using these arguments to explain African
American economic and political disadvantage diverts attention from
structural causes for Black social problems and lays the blame on African
Americans themselves. Pandering to misogyny within African American
communities, new versions of Black gender ideology evolve into one of
perpetrator and victim in which African American men are “too weak”
because African American women are “too strong” (2005, 184).
These ideas link Collins’ conceptualization of the “new racism” to the ideas put forth by the
Moynihan report of 1965 regarding the “pathological” black family. These arguments go as
follows: if only poor black women would have fewer children, there would be more
resources to go around for all black people; if only black men and women would relate to one
another as middle- and upper-class white men and women tend to, then black people would
have better jobs, housing, and health care. These arguments not only wrongly place all of the
blame for social injustice and inequality on the targets of those ills, they further devalue
black womanhood by identifying problems associated with black communities as intricately
linked to issues of black femininity and black reproduction.
Yet these arguments are familiar, dating back to the 17th century when John Locke,
and the 19th century when John Stuart Mill, both explicitly linked poverty to
overreproduction (see Hirschmann 2003). They arose out of class-based, rather than race-
based views. What Moynihan added to these arguments, and what Collins discusses above,
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is the racist dimension. The racialization of class in the United States today (Roberts 1997)
may explain this addition. Roberts argues that welfare policy, though clearly motivated by
class-based views, also has an important racist feature. These arguments, with the addition
of the racist dimension, perpetuate racism and classism by ignoring their complex causes,
and by charging poor, black people with culpability for their own oppression. Furthermore,
these arguments misread the intersectionality of the structural, social forces that engender
such social problems. Racist, sexist, and classist oppressions, among others, combine,
mutually construct, and together create the contexts in which poverty, joblessness, poor
health care, and poor housing develop in black communities today. And in order to self-
perpetuate, these oppressive systems form and misshape societal perceptions of the causes of
these phenomena, such as placing fault with black women, who are, in fact, the ones most
hurt by the intersectionality of these forces.
Conceptualization of intersectionality in black women’s experiences of oppression
allows for a greater understanding of the experiences of women more generally. Indeed, Liu
argues that oppression based on race is intimately linked to oppression based on gender:
“[r]acism is a kind of sexism which does not treat all women the same, but drives wedges
between us on the basis of our daily experiences, our assigned functions within the social
order” (1994, 581). That black women’s experiences are, in part, shaped by racism, entails
that white women’s experiences are shaped by a lack of racism. That black women often
experience the intersection of classist oppression with racial and gender-based oppression,
also reveals more about white women’s experiences, such as that white women often
experience the intersection of gender-based oppression with the lack of race-based
oppression, and in some instances, these forces interact with class-based oppression. The
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intersection of classism with other forms of oppression in black women’s experiences, and
the extent to which classism itself is racialized, according to Roberts, suggests an opening for
examining the workings of class in white women’s experiences, as well. Understanding
black women’s experiences with these intersecting oppressions can illuminate how white
women experience a different set of intersecting experiences; the presence or absence of
classist oppression intersecting with the absence of racist oppression, concomitant with the
presence of sexist oppression, is given meaning partially by understanding how some of these
forces intersect for black women.
Black feminism, then, and the method of Gender Plus, or the consideration of at least
one further level of inquiry beyond gender in feminist analysis, both point to the concept of
intersectionality and point out that women all face intersecting oppressions. Hispanic
lesbians, for example, also face racism, sexism, and possibly classism, but their experiences
are also shaped by societal heterosexism. Problematic for feminism is that views of women
can become skewed by oppressive forces that erase the experiences of some women from the
collective consciousness, and thus distort the category “woman.” In part because of the new
racism, dis-engagement has allowed for the de-emphasis of white women’s race. We can see
from the perspective of intersectionality, however, that just as black women’s race, and
societal attitudes toward it, have enormous effect on their experiences of oppression, white
women’s race and societal attitudes toward it can likely be shown to affect white women’s
experiences of oppression. Intersectionality informs a more inclusive feminism that seeks to
account for the important differences among women which shape their lives. In the next and
final chapter, I will discuss the implications race and racism have for white women feminists,
as well as the importance of differences for a comprehensive movement.
59
Part IV: Conclusion
For difference must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities
between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic (Audre Lorde 1979).
Feminism has been a splintered movement for the past forty or so years. Hartsock
dates the separatist movements within feminism from the mid to late nineteen sixties (1998,
59), and accounts for the divisions in feminism through a conceptualization of difference.
She argued in the 1980s that feminism’s relationship to difference has developed on a
trajectory: feminism has “moved from a denial of the importance of difference, through
avoidance of difference, to the beginnings of a recognition that the differences among us
need not imply relations of domination” (1998, 56). I argue that today, feminism is in a
similar position to that in which Hartsock saw it in the 1980s; it has yet constructively to
appreciate the differences among women. A recognition of the link between difference and
domination has been central to feminism. For instance, the fact of differences between the
genders has been used to justify the domination of men over women (Hartsock 1998, 56; see
also MacKinnon 1987). Hartsock uses a three-part typology to describe the ways in which
difference is used to legitimize domination: differences as empirical phenomena—we are not
all alike; Difference, or “radical alterity”—when differences “are given a particular social and
even ontological meaning…and thereby can be used as a basis for domination”; and
specificity, or “positive collective identity” (1998, 57). She argues that when differences
among women, e.g. occupation, race, ethnicity, height, hair color, sexuality etc., are seen to
relate to the essence or nature of women, then they become Difference; and when the
argument is made that some women are fundamentally different from other women, then the
possibility of a shared reality among women is erased and power relationships develop in
60
place of collectivity. Some feminist thinkers have, however, mistakenly assumed that
differences must be directly related to Difference, and thus to domination. Some of these
women sought to avoid Difference in the construction of the movement by rejecting all
pretenses of leadership or hierarchy within the movement, while others, insisting that the
dominant feminist voices did not speak for them, avoided Difference by forming their own
movements, or branches of feminism, as a strategy for rejecting domination (Hartsock 1998,
61). The failure to take up the issue of Difference by some feminists, however, at times went
hand in hand with a failure to recognize power structures and the social construction of
“otherness” within the movement. Since Difference caused “othered” groups to split off,
those who remained were not confronted with its relationship to domination and how that
relationship had affected their feminist ideology.
Instead, Hartsock argues, the feminist practice that has appreciated differences as
specificity, or “positive collective identity,” is a constructive move away from domination
and toward action (1998, 58). Allowing for variance among women to exist within the
category “woman” allows for the inclusion of the marginalized. Even this approach is
incomplete, however; she advocates the development of a universal theory of feminism that
embraces differences as a source of creative tension (1998, 67), of constructive debate, rather
than simply as a framework for reacting to patriarchy. Acknowledging the importance of
mainstream feminism as well as of the branches, such as lesbian feminism, Chicana
feminism, and black feminism, she also asks: how can we work together despite our
important differences? Her response is “that it is only possible at present by using,
preserving, and enhancing our differences” (1998, 69).
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As the reasoning behind Gender Plus argues, the attempt to suppress differences does
not work. “White feminism” cannot justifiably pass itself off as unmodified “feminism,”
because its scope is more specific than that. In its modified form, “white feminism” has
constructed differences in race as Difference rather than as specificity, which has, in turn,
given way to the development of a power relationship within feminism in which white
women have power over women of color. This power relationship replaces the potential of
differences as specificity for positive collective identity, with “white feminists’” false claim
to universality. We may learn something about all women by studying white women, but we
will not know what we have learned unless we acknowledge the source. Thus, although the
term “feminism” exists, a truly universal feminist theory is one that is self-aware in that it
makes room for differences among women and the variance in women’s experiences. Scales
argues for a new approach to jurisprudence that favors “concrete universality,” or that “takes
differences as constitutive of the universal itself…[that] sees differences as systematically
related to each other and to other relations, such as exploited and exploiter…[and that]
regards differences as emergent, as always changing” (1993, 101). This approach
incorporates differences as “multiplicity” (Scales 1993, 101), and rejects Difference as it
relates to exploitation and domination. Instead of using equality between the sexes as the
standard for jurisprudence regarding gender-based oppression, the priority instead becomes
recognizing and invalidating “enforced inferiority” (Scales 1993, 103). In other words,
rather than using differences to highlight how everyone must be treated equally,
jurisprudence must take into account differences in order to understand how they can
ultimately translate into domination.
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An appreciation for the fact that our shared biological identity is not in itself enough
to presuppose our shared social identity, underpins the search for a universal theory of
feminism, one that can celebrate specificity while bringing women together. The differences
among women become Difference as they acquire social meaning, and thus interact with
oppressive forces that engender systems of domination. Recognition of such a trajectory
must be part of the development of a universal theory of feminism because, as hooks states,
“it is the dominant race that reserves for itself the luxury of dismissing racial identity while
the oppressed race is made daily aware of their racial identity. It is the dominant race that
can make it seem that their experience is representative” (1981, 138). In other words,
suppression of differences is a way of ensuring the expression of domination because only
the already dominant group(s) has the political and social power to suppress those
differences. The differences that are suppressed are therefore more likely to be those that
threaten the self-concepts of the dominant group(s), and social hierarchies are thus
reproduced within a movement designed precisely to fight, in this case, a social hierarchy.
Pence (1982), a white woman feminist, tells her story of coming to the realization that
racism was a problem she had, rather than just a problem black people faced. Hers is a
success story about how differences and even Difference, when approached thoughtfully, do
not have to engender domination, but can rather lead to greater self-conception and the
breakdown of oppressive forces. In that she rebelled against her openly racist father during
the 1960s, Pence thought she had dealt with the possibility of racism in her own world-view
and had stamped it out. Her involvement in feminism led to her interaction with black
women who expressed anger and frustration towards white feminists:
I watched Blacks and Indians accuse white feminist women of racism.
Certainly, they didn’t mean me…I too was oppressed by the white male.
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So when I heard women of color speaking of white privileges, I mentally
inserted the word “male”: “white male privileges” (1982, 45).
Through discussion with a black woman friend of hers, Pence discovered parallels between
men’s domination of women and white women’s domination of women of color within the
feminist movement:
I began to see how white women ignored the need to examine the
traditional white rigid methods of decision making, priority setting, and
implementing decisions. Our idea of including women of color was to
send out notices. We never came to the business table as equals. Women
of color joined us on our terms (1982, 46).
Only when they reexamine their own behaviors and approaches can white women feminists
see how they might be reinforcing the subordination of women of color. She concludes now
that whites must consider racism to be a problem that negatively affects them as well as
people of color:
We must acknowledge what we think we have to lose by this
understanding [of racism in our own views] and find what we have to gain
by eliminating our racism. We must believe that racism causes us to be
less human and work toward humanizing ourselves (1982, 47).
Ideally, the inclusion of differences in the feminist repertoire will lead to revised self-
conceptions, given that forces of oppression, such as racism and classism, remain just as
prevalent as sexism in the politics of U.S. society. A fundamental benefit of confronting
differences in a constructive manner are the new, less perverse understandings that are born,
and the possibilities for engagement in a less skewed, more complete feminism.
Barbara Smith echoes Pence’s point, but does so from her perspective as a black
woman frustrated by white women’s tendency to express being “tired of hearing about
racism”; she counters that black women are “much more tired…of constantly experiencing
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it” (1982, 48). She places importance on white women’s recognition of how harmful their
racism is to themselves, for the advancement of the feminist movement:
You have to comprehend how racism distorts and lessens your own lives
as white women—that racism affects your chances of survival, too, and
that it is very definitely your issue (1982, 49).
The importance of “white feminists” fighting racism can be argued in two ways. First,
racism is morally wrong and should be stamped out. And what better place to engage in that
struggle than a movement committed to stamping out oppression that, for the most part,
targets women, while so many women experience racism? It is intellectually and
theoretically consistent for a movement based on an end to oppression to fight all kinds of
oppression. Insofar as feminism is “the political theory and practice that struggles to free all
women” (Smith 1982, 49), white women feminists who do not seek out and break down their
own racism allow it to persist within themselves and within the movement, and by doing so,
compromise the potency of feminism.
Second, it is politically expedient for “white feminists” to fight racism. A weaker
feminism is weaker for all women; the intersectionality of issues of race and class with issues
of gender entail that effectively redressing one necessitates effectively redressing all. If you
do not stand against all oppression, then, at root, you do not stand against oppression at all.
Indeed, Audre Lorde echoes this line of reasoning: “white feminists have educated
themselves about such an enormous amount over the past ten years, how come you haven’t
also educated yourselves about black women and differences between us—white and black—
when it is key to our survival as a movement?” (1981, 100). One particular example of how
racism can negatively affect white women, albeit that white women often benefit from race
privilege, is that white women on welfare in the United States suffer from the racism of a
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policy that determines the state support they receive. This is discussed further below (see
Hirschmann, 2003).
While white women feminists face the task of finding and acknowledging their own
racism, black women feminists face the task of resisting the temptation to curry favor with
more privileged classes by deemphasizing racism. Hull and Smith warn black women
thinkers against intellectual “passing” as “a dangerously limiting solution for Black women,
a non-solution that makes us invisible women” (1982, xxiv). In their work designed to guide
and to act as a reference text for the creation of black women’s studies programs, Hull and
Smith argue that black women’s studies must be an intellectual space for black women to
express and explore their ideas freely. Black women must make use of that space by giving
primacy to the issues they face, the issues that have often been deemed less important by
both feminism and antiracism. The study of black women’s experiences can contribute to the
practice of constructively examining how differences become Difference and, in turn, lead to
domination. Bringing issues of race to the forefront can allow feminists of varying
perspectives and identities to come together to search out their own racism, to learn about
their history, to be exposed to black women’s creative production, and thereby to embrace
differences as the means to a better understanding of feminism.
A careful and authentic analysis of the differences themselves can be the very source
of a broader, more inclusive approach to feminism. Hooks (1984) proposes a definition of
feminism that she contends will blaze the path for the achievement of a universal feminist
theory by making room for differences among women. Feminism, hooks argues, is a
“movement to end sexist oppression” (1984, 26). Hooks defines feminism in this way, as a
shift away from a feminism that seeks to achieve social equality between the genders (1984,
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30), because the latter does not convey a broad enough understanding of social forces
pertinent to feminism. For instance, if feminism were primarily concerned with social
equality, with whom would women seek to be equal? “Men” is the apparent answer, but
which men? As hooks points out, black women do not have as a goal social equality with
black men, whom they know to be politically and economically disadvantaged due to racism.
“Equality with men” as the central tenet of feminism lumps men into one large,
homogeneous group, and presupposes all men’s social statuses to be enviable for all women.
This tenet does not account for divisions in the societal power structure that fall along racial
and class lines; it does not account for the important social and political differences among
women. Nor does it account for the men who, themselves, are victims of sexist oppression,
e.g. gay men. “Feminism as a movement to end sexist oppression,” instead, leaves open the
possibility—indeed, points to the reality—that a variety of social forces interact with sexism
in practice. By defining feminism in terms of its struggle, this description highlights the need
to end the forces that structurally oppose women’s advancement, and it does so rather than
centering men as an ideal, or presuming men are an ideal. This approach also differs from
“sexism-only feminism” in that it seeks not to isolate experiences of sexism from other
oppressive experiences, but instead to understand how sexism operates with other forms of
oppression. Hooks’ strategy is a way of building Hartsock’s specificity. Feminism as a
struggle includes under its umbrella all the women who face that struggle, and thus creates a
positive collective identity. This definition also recognizes that those affected by sexism
have widely varying experiences:
By repudiating the popular notion that the focus of feminist movement
should be equality of the sexes and emphasizing eradicating the cultural
basis of group oppression, our own analysis would require an exploration
of all aspects of women’s political reality. This would mean that race and
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class oppression would be recognized as feminist issues with as much
relevance as sexism (hooks 1984, 25).
Feminism as a movement against oppression instead of for a particular, arguably narrow and
misdirected, goal, puts the focus instead on understanding the oppression women face and
how it operates differently for different women. Thus, hooks argues, the conception of
sexism broadens. Once we ask how sexism operates in the lives of women, we are pointed
towards the reality of sexism’s interconnectedness with other oppressive forces, and we are
confronted, as well, with the diversity of women’s experiences:
When feminism is defined in such a way that it calls attention to the
diversity of women’s social and political reality, it centralizes the
experiences of all women, especially the women whose social conditions
have been least written about, studied, or changed by political movements.
When we cease to focus on the simplistic stance “men are the enemy,” we
are compelled to examine systems of domination and our role in their
maintenance and perpetuation (hooks 1984, 25).
Hooks’ conception of feminism seeks to account for the totality of women’s experiences by
providing conceptual space for the range of oppressions women confront. She aims to move
feminists toward a universal theory of feminism by broadening the category “woman.”
Arguing that “white feminists” have been able to dominate the feminist movement because
of the lack of an adequate definition, she differentiates her conception of feminism from a
feminism that seeks to benefit a “particular race or class of women” (1984, 26). Accounting
for a group as diverse as “women” involves considering the contexts in which sexism
operates. The United States is a complex society, and any one woman encounters a wide
sampling of that complexity. We are born with certain bodies, certain body types and skin
colors. These are “read” in particular ways that define how we see ourselves. We are defined
by others and by ourselves in an interactive dynamic: what comes out of that definitional
process is “identity.” Our contexts create our experiences which form our identities.
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Understanding not only how society sees us, but also understanding ourselves, is key to
recognizing ways in which we are oppressed. This recognition can, in turn, help us to
understand the structural forces stemming from the interactions among contexts, identities,
and social constructions that engender our oppressions. As I argued in Part III, whether or
not our race determines a set of structural barriers we face, will in itself affect the formation
of the barriers we face due to our gender. In other words, our experiences are multifaceted
just as our selves are multifaceted. Just as we each represent the integration of our race,
gender, class, sexual orientation, etc., what we see, what we suffer, what we are held back
from, what we accomplish, and how others see us and make us suffer are all, at least in part,
shaped by the intersectionality of our identities and contexts and how structural forces of
oppression respond to them.
Since our differences are so central to our identities and contexts—insofar as
Difference and then domination arise from them—acknowledging and trying to understand
those differences is a project fundamental to feminism. If we take feminism to be a
movement to end sexist oppression, then, as I argued in Part I, and as hooks argues, the first
step is to understand women and the oppressions they experience. Doing so involves
recognizing intersectionality in that differences are experienced along simultaneous vectors,
e.g. black women, not just various vectors, e.g. black + women. Intersectionality describes
not just overlapping, additive layers but mutually constructing, interweaving threads. One
way to conceptualize the intersection of race and gender in shaping women’s experiences
with sexism is the mule and dog metaphor from Gwaltney’s interview with Nancy White (see
Part I, p. 9). White draws an analogy between white women and “the master’s” dog, and
between black women and “the master’s” mule. White women are socially constructed to
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function as house pets, to love the master and to be duped into feeling like part of the family,
all the while being treated like an animal. The essence of “dogness” is to love to work; the
ideal dog has fun working and gets its whole sense of being from that. Black women, on the
other hand, know that they are not part of the family and that the master does not love them;
they know they are treated like animals rather than human beings. A mule, in contrast to a
dog, is a beast of burden, and always needs to be told what to do or forced, and cannot be
“trained” like a dog. In this metaphor, white women have not distanced themselves from
their privilege and therefore have not been able completely to recognize their oppression.
Their comfortable living arrangements, within the house and near the master, have impeded
them from seeing that their status is that of the family pet; they happily engage in the work of
the master; they willingly participate in the master’s racial dominance and thereby preserve
their own privilege. Black women as “mules” have no pretense that they are anything other
than mules in the master’s eyes. They are also aware of white women’s standing as dogs
because their own “outsider within” status (Collins 1986) allows them a more complete, less
perverse perspective. While it could be argued that white women as “dogs” also have
“outsider within” status—in that they live in the house with the family, but are animals rather
than family members—that status has not always led them to an awareness of their relative
lack of power in comparison with the master, together with their simultaneous, relative
power over those that sleep in the barn. Or, it has not always led them to a desire to question
that power structure. It is their own racial privilege that white women have not yet
recognized, or been motivated to break down, that prevents them from seeing that they are
“dogs” in the master’s house.
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Following the prescriptions of Pence (1982) and Smith (1982), white women must
endeavor to distance themselves from the privilege of the master’s den by distancing
themselves from their race privilege and (for many) from their class privilege, in order fully
to recognize how their oppression is constituted. Pence knew she was oppressed by white
men, but until she examined her own racism, she did not know the role her race privilege
played in her experiences of sexism. Neither did she, therefore, understand as fully as she
had presumed, black women’s experiences with sexism. Smith conceptualizes the mule and
dog metaphor by comparing white men’s and white women’s roles in racism, and pointing
out that white women’s racism holds them back from liberation too:
White women have a materially different relationship to the system of
racism than white men. They get less out of it and often function as its
pawns, whether they recognize this or not. It is something that living
under white-male rule has imposed on us; and overthrowing racism is the
inherent work of feminism and by extension feminist studies (1982, 51).
Instead of “dog,” Smith uses the term “pawn” to describe white women’s status. Pawn status
is analogous to dog status in that, in both roles, white women are less than human, and fulfill
the function of furthering someone else’s purposes, namely those of white men. If white
women, too, enjoy the race privilege of a racist patriarchy, that privilege arises primarily as a
byproduct, and is not enough justifiably to offset their less-than-human “pawn” status.
Preferring the perpetuation of racism to relinquishing the benefits that derive from complicity
in that perpetuation is morally problematic. Moreover, in order to fight subordination with
political efficacy, white women must forego whatever gains come from their contribution to
their own subordination.
Hooks also identifies the need for white feminists to gain understanding of their
social status because so far, their general lack of acknowledgement of “the inter-relatedness
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of sex, race, and class oppression” or their “refus[al] to take this inter-relatedness seriously”
has prevented white feminists of privilege from being able to communicate effectively with
diverse groups of women (1984, 14). She, as well as Hartsock, points to absence of the
recognition of differences from the center of feminism as an explanation for the movement’s
fragmentation.
Gender Plus advocates the primacy in feminist discourse of recognizing such
differences. Presupposing feminism to be a movement to end sexist oppression, as hooks
suggests, Gender Plus calls for incorporating into feminist theory an analysis of other forms
of oppression and their intersection with sexism. In that Gender Plus asks for attention to,
and acknowledgement of, at least one level of inquiry beyond gender in the production of
feminist theory, and given my example of race, Gender Plus can serve as a method for
breaking white women out of the fog of race privilege which serves to perpetuate their social
status as dogs in the master’s house. That “white feminism” exists is perfectly acceptable to
Gender Plus, which welcomes exploration of the differences among women. That “white
feminism” does not acknowledge its “whiteness,” however, can begin to be solved by Gender
Plus’s requirement that the identities and contexts studied in feminist theory be stated
explicitly. Fulfilling that requirement will also solve the problem of white women as “dogs”
and of black women as “mules.” In other words, women will not be “dogs” or “mules”
anymore, but rather people. White women feminists’ acknowledgement of their race and
their race privilege will help pave the way for acknowledgement of racism, and furthermore,
for the deconstruction of that racism. Similarly, black feminism’s clearly defined scope
pinpoints an intersection of identities and oppressions such that work can begin effectively to
end sexist oppression in practice. As hooks and Scales argue, the point of feminism is to end
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oppression and domination, rather than to equalize experiences. By sacrificing race
privilege, white women will not then become “mules,” but will rather achieve personhood,
just as black women, too, will achieve personhood, rather than graduating to the status of
“dogs.”
As Hartsock describes the evolution of the feminist movement, groups of feminists
who sought to break away from racial domination within the feminist movement formed
separatist feminist movements, leaving only the feminists of race privilege to comprise the
movement broadly defined as “feminism.” Even though “white feminists” did not separate
per se, their position within feminism could more accurately be described as a branch of
feminism not unlike black feminism, rather than as “feminism.” In other words, Gender Plus
does not advocate white women’s split from feminism, but rather argues that “white
feminism” is already a more specific movement than feminism, and should be practiced and
positioned accordingly. Engaging in Gender Plus by calling themselves “white feminists”
would redress “white feminism’s” domination of “feminism,” and open up the feminist
conceptual space to the differences from which we can learn so much, about ourselves and
each other. Gender Plus, therefore, points to how complicated sexist oppression is in
practice, and in so doing, shows how exacting the practice of feminist theory must be.
Gender Plus, then, can be seen as a universal theory of feminism. Insofar as it
underscores differences, it simultaneously stresses the point that all women have a gender, a
race, a class, etc. It draws commonality from the fact of difference, and unites women under
the rubric of using and learning differences in order better to understand each other, and to
end sexist oppression. As a method for conducting feminist theory, it directs feminists
toward a realistic project of inclusion. Effective universality cannot hope to be cultivated
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through homogenization. In order for all women to fit under one feminist theory, that theory
has at the least, to account for, at the best embrace, difference.
What does it technically mean to embrace difference, however? How far does one
have to go to be recognized as embracing difference? Is one level of inquiry beyond gender
enough to embrace difference? Collins (2000 and 2005), hooks (1984), Anzaldúa (1990), the
Combahee River Collective (1981), and Roberts (1997) all insert considerations of class as
well as race and gender into their intersectional analyses. Certainly classism is a potent,
oppressive force women face in the U.S. Given the extent to which class is racialized
(Roberts 1997, 110), however, can it be said to have as much influence over women’s
experiences as race does? Or does the assertion that “class distinctions are racialized” mean
simply that classism and racism intersect in their effects, and that the lines between them are
blurred? Could we not just as easily say, in view of the consistent differences between black
and white women’s experiences, that gender is racialized? These questions point to the
difficulties of categorization, such as how to create a finite category that is inclusive enough
to consider everyone who meets its criteria, but exclusive enough to function as a category.
Some of those difficulties go beyond the scope of this paper. However, whether
intersectional analysis can legitimately choose two forms of oppression to study, separating
them from other forms of oppression with which they may be inextricably intertwined, is
pertinent to the discussion of this paper.
Collins argues that the social construction of race and racist oppression have a greater
effect on black women’s experiences than does class:
But how does one explain the persistence of poverty among White
Americans if poverty has long been attributed to Black biological
inferiority? They are not biologically Black, but their poverty and
downward mobility can be explained if they are seen as being culturally or
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socially Black. Whites who embrace Black culture become positioned
closer to Blacks and become stigmatized. In the context of the new
racism, cultural explanations for economic success and poverty substitute
for biological arguments concerning intelligence or genetic dispositions
for immorality or violence (2005, 41).
Class distinctions in the U.S., by this thinking, follow the social construction of race
distinctions. Cultural definitions arise from racial hierarchies and are then applied to class
distinctions. Hirschmann (2003) makes a similar argument regarding poor white women on
welfare. Since welfare policy in the United States has developed through racist biases (even
though more whites receive welfare benefits than blacks), or in other words, with a racist
picture held fast in the minds of legislators, the cultural conception of welfare holds race as
the central identifying feature of women on welfare (the “welfare queen”). Insofar as welfare
poses limitations on women recipients’ freedoms (see, for example, Hirschmann 2003, 147),
the policies of its practice can be more damaging than helpful to those women. Hirschmann
argues that the social constructions of gender, race, and class form stereotypes of welfare
recipients that, in turn, drive welfare policy. In other words, the socially constructed bias that
“black women cannot be good mothers, no matter what, because they are poor and lazy, so
they should be forced to work for a living” (Hirschmann 2003, 158) has been fundamental to
the development of welfare policies that require recipients to work. Such requirements pose
difficulties for women, particularly those who are mothers of young children (Hirschmann
2003, 142-43) and those who are victims of Intimate Partner Violence (Hirschmann 2003,
147). From the theoretical perspective of feminism, “welfare reform, in its rush to get
women off welfare, no matter how, seems to seek to punish women simply for being
unmarried and poor” (Hirschmann 2003, 149), and thus arguably, for being “culturally or
socially Black” in Collins’ terms. White women on welfare are punished for being
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unmarried and poor; and since the “good” white woman is married and middle-class, and all
black women are defined as unmarried and poor, those unmarried and poor white women
become, ipso facto, black. The stereotyped images of “poor and lazy” black women are
generalized to all women welfare recipients, and thus, white women on welfare are in this
way considered black. One could argue, alternatively, that classism trumps both sexism and
racism insofar as welfare policy requiring the poor, including whites and including women,
to work date back to Locke’s and Mill’s poverty-inspired and class-based reforms. In
today’s post-Civil Rights climate of the “new racism,” however, policies originally designed
with classist notions at the forefront, have taken on notably racist and sexist qualities.
The culture and social status of blackness in the U.S. intimately interacts with class,
such that class becomes an expression of racism. Or could it be instead that the social
constructions of gender, race, and class function to obfuscate the role of class to some extent?
Hartsock argues that issues of class have been “so well excluded from public debate in the
United States, [that] there seems to be even less awareness of classist behavior than of
racism” (1998, 66). This could well explain my understanding of the relationship between
race and class as race-dominant. Further exploration of the exclusion of class from discourse
on social hierarchies could serve to illuminate the role of class. Hooks contends that it is
feminism’s disregard of race considerations that has obscured the relationship between race
and class:
[C]lass structure in American society has been shaped by the racial politic
of white supremacy; it is only by analyzing racism and its function in
capitalist society that a thorough understanding of class relationships can
emerge. Class struggle is inextricably bound to the struggle to end racism
(1984, 3).
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Class can perhaps only really be understood once race is understood. This logic supports that
of Collins and Hirschmann in that it acknowledges the link between race and class, but also
seems to give more weight to racism than classism. We may not come to a definitive answer
as to their precise relationship until both are aggressively taken up in feminist and political
theory.
Thus, justifying the demand for only one level of inquiry beyond gender may be
difficult. Gender Plus, instead, requires at least one further level of inquiry. This wording
acknowledges the force of intersectionality, but it also cautions that endless categorization
dissolves categories themselves; it points to what is realistically possible in the development
of theory based on categories. For instance, once we begin to move towards greater
specificity in our study of women, greater accuracy in our claims to “positive collective
identity,” do we not simultaneously dissolve the category “woman”? In other words, if black
women have a particular experience of oppression, do not also black women who are
lesbians? And black women who are Jewish? Black lesbians who are Jewish? Arguably,
every individual’s experiences differ at least slightly from that of every other. In order to
theorize about the effects of political and social forces on people, one must categorize. But
too much specificity diminishes utility for the whole. Furthermore, although no one woman
can be said to be quintessentially “woman,” or quintessentially “black woman,” there
remains the reality of collective identity. Black women, Collins reasons, differ as much from
each other on an individual level as they do from white women or Latina women or Asian-
American women, but black women share a collective viewpoint (2000, 28) that is tied to
their intersectional identities.
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An important principle to associate with the politics of Gender Plus is the value in
assuming that not all voices have spoken. Pence ran into difficulty with black feminists
when she assumed that her views of sexist oppression counted for them, too. Although
categories are useful for analyzing social and political phenomena, they must be divested, at
least partly, of their power. The social construction of gender has made the category
“woman” important, but its inattention to the social construction of race and of racism has
assigned power to certain voices that are assumed to speak for the whole category “woman.”
Similarly, the category “black” has been shaped by the social construction of gender such
that particular voices have been heard more than others in the self-definition of “blackness.”
Gender Plus pushes feminist theory into the margins by re-centralizing women whose race,
class, sexuality, etc. have rendered their voices mute. It contends that social forces other than
gender have shaped our gendered experiences, and demands to know how, thereby
reconstituting the so-called center as equivalent to the so-called margins, in that each only
represents a subset of women. This approach illuminates the fact that the relative power of
“women” (assumed white) as over against “black women” (stated black) has located the
former in the “center” and the latter in the “margins.”
Therefore, not only are certain women systematically excluded from the category
“woman,” but the very term used to refer to the category from which they are excluded is
misleading. The word “woman” is supposedly race-neutral, but politically refers to a
particular race of women (i.e. white women) (Hull et al. 1982). Our discourse is thus
complicit with, and perhaps at the same time constitutive of, the racism that renders it
inaccurate. Gender Plus seeks to put power differences under the limelight by revealing the
forces that constitute them (i.e. racism, classism), but to the extent that our language prevents
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us from seeing those forces, Gender Plus may be difficult to achieve. It will take a conscious
effort, especially on the part of white feminists, to examine their own racism and how it
relates to power structures within feminism. That the advancement of feminism has been
stunted by racism and domination on the part of “white feminists” can be explained by the
inconsistency between “white feminists’” supposed opposition to power, but simultaneous
employment of it. For feminism to become a universal movement for all women, it is
imperative that white women free themselves from the race and class privilege that keeps
them from fully understanding their own oppression, and accept status as a subset of the
category “woman” rather than the whole category itself. It will take the conscious effort of
assuming that not all the voices have been heard.
Such an effort presupposes a level of foresight in the discourse. Hartsock places
importance on the quality of a theory that lays the groundwork for theories to follow.
“Perhaps the most fundamental question to be asked of every strategy for change is this:
How does this strategy contain at least the seeds of its own supersession?” (Hartsock 1998,
70). How does Gender Plus create a framework for a further point on the trajectory of
feminism’s advancement? Gender Plus is, in part, a universalizing theory in that it de-centers
those with disproportional power and centers those with disproportional lack of power, in the
feminist movement, such that each subset of women is on theoretical equal footing with each
other subset, and all are included in the category “woman.” It can highlight the race of white
women, for example, in order to engender a less partial, less perverse perspective for white
women and thus to show what their contributions add to feminism. It is, in part, a universal
theory of feminism in that it outlines theoretical strategies for all feminist thinkers, but it also
contains, in part, the seeds for a universal feminist theory. Gender Plus acts as an
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intermediary stage between fragmented, separatist feminisms and a universal feminism, by
exposing the forces that have impeded the latter. It does so by accentuating the analysis
rather than the suppression of, the differences among women. Its basis is the belief that only
when we truly understand women and the struggles they face, can we effectively end sexist
oppression. Furthermore, Gender Plus contains the seeds of its own supersession in that once
feminists begin truly to understand women and to eradicate sexist oppression, hooks argues,
they will find themselves involved in a much larger project:
Since all forms of oppression are linked in our society because they are
supported by similar institutional and social structures, one system cannot
be eradicated while the others remain intact (1984, 35).
In that Gender Plus calls for at least one level of inquiry beyond gender, it operates at a stage
prior to the stage at which sexist oppression can be eradicated. A theory designed genuinely
to eradicate sexist oppression in practice must exist on a grander scale; it must require that all
vectors of oppression be examined and countered together. Gender Plus is a way of
inaugurating this larger project; it functions as an important piece, opening up feminism to a
greater universality, and it will necessitate an ensuing, more comprehensive approach to
eradicating sexist oppression.
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